

JPRS-EER-92-010  
24 JANUARY 1992



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# East Europe

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# East Europe

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## CONTENTS

24 January 1992

### BULGARIA

- Viktor Vulkov Reviews Foreign Policy Issues [ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME 12, 13 Nov] ..... 1

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Havel's Statements on Slovakia Challenged [SLOVENSKY NAROD 16 Dec]	5
Miklosko on Slovaks, Czechs, Alienation [SLOVENSKA NEDELA 12 Dec]	6
Common State in Light of Sociological Research [KULTURNY ZIVOT 10 Dec]	9
People's Party Supports Relations With Ruthenia [LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE 18 Dec]	12
Writer Claims Ruthenians Prefer Independence [PRACE 14 Dec]	13

### HUNGARY

Statements of MDF's Liberal, Populist Factions [MAGYAR HIRLAP 17 Dec]	14
SZDSZ, Smallholders' Parliamentary Group Meet [MAGYAR HIRLAP 17 Dec]	14
Tardos Attacks Kupa's Optimism in Debate [MAGYAR HIRLAP 16 Dec]	14
Delay in Adopting 'State Household' Law [MAGYAR HIRLAP 16 Dec]	15
Regional Prefect, Budapest Mayor Clash [NEPSZABADSAG 17 Dec]	16
Media Evaluated in MDF's Internal Newsletter [MAGYAR HIRLAP 17 Dec]	17
Bankruptcy Law Provisions Analyzed [NEPSZABADSAG 17 Dec]	17

### ROMANIA

Vatra Gathering Attended by FSN, PUNR [ROMANIA LIBERA 26 Nov]	19
PNT-cd Chief Speaks at International Congress [DREPTATEA 26-27 Nov]	20
Presidential Press Office Answers Roman Charges [ADEVARUL 28 Dec]	22
Ilieșcu's Negative Comments on Monarchy Criticized [ROMANIA LIBERA 26 Nov]	23
Stolojan Urged To Resolve Cultural Needs [ROMANIA LIBERA 26 Nov]	24
Suto Article Contents Termmed Lies, Exaggerations [LIBERTATEA 20-22 Dec]	25
Ministry of National Defense Promotions [MONITORUL OFICIAL 13 Dec]	26

### YUGOSLAVIA

Rupel's Democrats Lead in DELO Poll [DELO 28 Dec]	27
Slovene Daily Planned in Trieste, Ljubljana [DELO 4 Jan]	27

**Viktor Vulkov Reviews Foreign Policy Issues**

*92BA0172A Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME  
in Bulgarian 12, 13 Nov 91*

[Article in two installments by Georgi Traykov, covering interview with Viktor Vulkov, minister of foreign affairs, in Sofia on 11 November: "I Am Satisfied—We Completed the Main Tasks"]

[12 Nov pp 1, 4]

[Text] [Traykov] On Friday, one hour before the membership of the new government was announced, I had a talk with Mr. Viktor Vulkov in the office of the minister of foreign affairs. I informed him in most general terms of the nature of the interview. One of the last questions was: "Is it true that you are preparing to go to Australia as ambassador?" The minister, however, wanted to begin with that one.

[Vulkov] I am not making preparations to become ambassador to Australia. There has been a slight difficulty. Someone, usually referred to as a well-informed source, had written that I was trying to become the ambassador to Austria. Now I am vacillating between the two countries, and I do not know which language I should begin to study—Austrian or Australian.

As to my career, I have considered the position of ambassador for quite some time. I am convinced that I would be a good Bulgarian ambassador. I maintain exceptionally extensive relations and acquaintanceships throughout the world (many of them related to my activities in the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]) and with business circles, inasmuch as one-half of my career has been in the field of foreign trade. I also acquired many new acquaintances as minister of foreign affairs.

[Traykov] What are your feelings as you leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? What were your successes and failures?

[Vulkov] I am leaving the ministry with a feeling of satisfaction because, it seems to me, the main tasks that faced us were carried out. These included the two main priorities: the desire to join the all-European institutions and the development of bilateral relations with our neighbors, which progressed quite well. Delving into details is unnecessary. Nonetheless, Bulgaria is waiting to become a member of the Council of Europe, something that, in all likelihood, will take place at the very beginning of next year. Bulgaria is about to become an associate member of the Common Market. We have signed new treaties with Greece and Germany. The text of a joint declaration with Turkey is almost agreed upon, and I hope that the new government will take up this issue again because the importance of such a declaration is great. This applies not only to Bulgarian-Turkish relations but also to the fact that relations between Bulgaria and Turkey are a permanent criterion whenever our Western friends assess the progress of the processes

of democratization in our country. Our relations with Turkey is something that still comes up at the opening of most political debates. Good relations are unquestionably in the interest of both countries. You know that there has been a great deal of accumulated mistrust and feelings that are being deliberately encouraged, I would say, both in Turkey and Bulgaria, that are intensifying mistrust and creating threats in one area or another. We must sensibly, calmly, guided by reason and real facts seek the best possible combination of the interests of Bulgaria with those of its national security and bear in mind that we can change neighbors only as a result of a war—and I believe no one would like that.

[Traykov] In your view, what should be continued by the new team?

[Vulkov] Above all, we must follow the tracks of bilateral treaties, some of which are almost ready, such as the one with Italy, which is about to be initiated. This could reliably be one of the first credits earned by the new government. Great progress has been made in drafting treaties with Switzerland and Romania. Work must go on in both directions I mentioned. Allow me to mention some future problems, which, logically, were not among the first pertaining to our foreign policy, although they have their own specific significance. This will allow me to also answer the question of what has been omitted, albeit due to lack of time.

I think it is imperative for purposeful efforts to be made to make our relations with the Arab countries more active. This is not only because, objectively, our ties to Israel have become stronger, ties that were interrupted for reasons we are familiar with and that simply did not exist. I do not mean by this that the balance was disrupted because, whenever Bulgaria establishes any relations whatsoever with anyone, in principle, such relations are not aimed at other countries. It is a question of interests, of a direction of interests, and, perhaps, of making the political focal point clearer. Of late, there have been no high-level visits in the development of ties to many Arab countries, on the level of ministers of foreign affairs, prime ministers, and heads of state. Yet the ties between Bulgaria and these countries will continue to play an important role. With some of them, they will be based, above all, on economic interests and not only on the fact that those countries have oil. It must be borne in mind that Bulgaria is a traditional exporter of a number of goods to their markets. We are known in those markets and are familiar with the competition and the market requirements. Unquestionably, the successful conclusion of the Middle East conference will enhance the importance of such ties.

Other areas to which greater attention should be paid are the Scandinavian Peninsula and countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and others. We were not quite active in those countries as well. This is an important forthcoming task that we should consider. Naturally, we must gradually think of keeping and further developing our relations with Latin America. Motivated by the

## BULGARIA

desire to be economical, we have even reduced Bulgaria's quantitative presence in that area. There is no Bulgarian mission on the almost entire western Latin American seaboard. Our presence in Africa is almost symbolic, with the exception of North Africa and Zimbabwe. The situation in Asia is similar. The fact that we elevated our consulate general in Australia to the level of embassy, which also caused a great deal of comment, is consistent with the interests of Bulgaria and does not entail higher costs that would frighten the taxpayer.

That is how I see, in most general terms, the development of things in the immediate future, which should be a natural extension of Bulgaria's active participation in multilateral global politics, in the United Nations, UNESCO, and others, which, actually, are routine tasks for this ministry.

[Traykov] Was there a great deal of criticism of the cadre policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Vulkov] The decision that was made as early as the time of the roundtable meeting concerning the personnel of that ministry was the requirement that they become depoliticized and have no party affiliation. As of then, I was among those who said it would be naive to think that someone firmly believing in the views of his party would be able, simply by signing a piece of paper, to terminate all of his ties to that party, unless he was a member for reasons of personal advantage. Let me hasten to add that a high percentage of the personnel of this ministry and of other ministries, as well, were party members precisely for advancement purposes, for which reason they had to be members of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. The question I ask is: After we demanded that these officials become depoliticized and have no party affiliation, and they did, how long are they to continue to pay for the fact that, at one point, they were members of that party? At that time, the stipulation we set should have been different: that anyone who had been a member of the BCP resign from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That would have created an interesting situation. I do not know how many nonparty members would have been left—probably a couple of typists. At that point, we would have provided full opportunities to a mass of "new talent."

I have repeatedly exchanged views with my colleagues from the other East European countries on the issue of cadre renovation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the course of practical discussions concerning the dropping of party affiliations. Mass manifestations of this kind, which a large number of people in our country apparently expected to take place, did not occur. It is a basic situation that, when cadre changes are made, to begin with you must have the necessary people with whom to replace the old ones. Unfortunately, no one had assembled such a group of people anywhere. The idea that it is sufficient to be somewhat familiar with a foreign language in order to become a diplomat is rather superficial.

As to the changes that were quite substantial, they were aimed in other directions and governed by other criteria. To begin with, we had to reduce the number of personnel. Currently, we have slightly fewer than 100 diplomats working abroad. This is the minimum number needed to be reasonably effective. Major reductions were made in the ministry in Sofia as well. Furthermore, some ambassadors were systematically reassigned to Bulgaria largely because of the disparity between possibilities and demands. Department heads were replaced on the basis of professional criteria. The leadership tried to avoid making this look like a purge, and I think we were successful in this respect. Such a thing, familiar from the recent past and to which we must not return, did not take place in the ministry. It would make me very happy if the new leadership applied maximum reason instead of political prejudice in the further renovation of cadres. Today, there are much greater opportunities to develop the skills of future diplomats. I hope we shall soon have suitably trained people, at which point we could think of replacements. Naturally, there would have to be valid reasons to replace them.

As to the lists of people that have been steadily published in different newspapers for a week, even a glance would immediately reveal their sameness. The only differences were in the transcription, the way poor students in school who crib include the errors of the other students. I cannot accept the fact that a skilled career diplomat should be stricken from the list simply because he was an official in the foreign department of the former Central Committee or was used as T. Zhivkov's interpreter. Generally speaking, it was the most capable diplomats who were recruited by the Central Committee's foreign department because it was there that our policy was being made. Now they, like all others, have met the conditions of the roundtable, and we should no longer make harsh demands on them.

Nor do I agree with the fact that we should excessively emphasize the fact that some people are the offspring of Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel. During that period, the children of some parents were being directed into diplomacy. They must not become sacrificial victims for bearing the names of their parents. If we are to go on adding names to such lists, we would have to include some of the people involved in their publication. One such person is Vladimir Filipov, a foreign policy expert in the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. That was precisely why I was so indignant about his criticism. Thus, when he demands that Vladimir Delchev, an impeccable diplomat, call himself Vladimir Borisov Delchev, the other one, as well, should call himself Vladimir Ivanov Filipov because he is the son of Ivan Filipov, who for 12 years was first secretary of the Blagoev Rayon BCP Committee in Sofia. I could not accept such things then, nor do I accept them now. This is a matter of principle.

Yanko Kozhukharov, a newly hatched specialist on matters of diplomacy, described my color as orange-red. Of late, there has been a proliferation of people suffering from

color blindness. However, there is something else here, as well. I was a member of the BZNS, and, while remaining in the BZNS and, subsequently, in the BZNS-e [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United], I promoted a change in the political line of that party, which has traditionally participated in Bulgarian political life. Others chose other means. They simply changed parties. I believe that I took the more dignified way. The fact that some people changed party affiliations, switching from the BCP to other parties and even assuming the leadership of such parties, is their own business. The fact that I am a member of the Agrarian Union did not have any essential impact on my personnel policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems to me that a member of another party would have quite certainly increased the participation of his fellow party members in the ministry.

[13 Nov p 4]

[Text]

**The Most Positive Feature Was the Lack of Drastic Position Changes**

[Traykov] To what extent did our international activities contribute to our national security?

[Vulkov] This problem was the core of establishing contacts with NATO, the European Council, and the Western European Union. Bulgaria had to and still must seek a resolution to the problems related to its national security on the basis of general European criteria. More specifically, the meaning of the bilateral treaties with the neighboring countries is also aimed at providing guarantees. Such treaties and regular meetings, both of which are being implemented, have their intrinsic psychological significance.

[Traykov] Do you feel that an impression is being created that we converted very quickly from the influence of the USSR to putting ourselves under the "wing" of the United States?

[Vulkov] This has its reasons. I think that it is due to the fact that a very big vacuum had to be filled, and, when this takes place within a period of 320 days, the impression is created of some kind of concentrated pressure and concentrated change. Matters will get settled in time. I am certain that Bulgaria should look for a proper balance in its relations with all countries. This is a basic rule in the foreign policy of any country. As to relations with the USSR, the events that are continuing to develop in that country were also a factor that kept us from maintaining normal relations. Now, for example, the signing of a new treaty for cooperation will not create any particular problems because the other former socialist countries that held discussions on a new treaty with the USSR were able to find some new formula concerning the controversial issue of "nonalignment with an unfriendly organization," which inevitably would have been the point at which we also would have stopped. We must be clear about the precise nature of the USSR with which we shall be signing a treaty.

It seems to me that the example of establishing diplomatic relations with Russia and the efforts that are already being made to establish bilateral relations with some of the republics are adequate proof of the fact that no one has had the intention of turning his back on the USSR. No sensible person in Bulgaria and, in my view, even less so in the Council of Ministers or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cannot fail to realize the importance of our relations with the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as information to this effect has been sneakily released, it has been dictated by the unclean intentions of its authors.

[Traykov] It is being said and written, both in the Bulgarian press and in some foreign newspapers, that the U.S. ambassador in our country is already properly taking over, with his instructions, the job of the former Soviet ambassadors to Bulgaria.

[Vulkov] Obviously, the great amount of freedom in the information media simply proved to be a spoon too big for our mouths, which are still too small when it comes to swallowing the facts and handling the truth.

[Traykov] Could this be a major breakthrough?

[Vulkov] I think the thing that indicates most positively the nature of our foreign policy during that period is that everything we accomplished was accomplished on a planned basis and within the shortest possible time. There were no sharp turns and changes in viewpoints. There was no wavering in our political line and, given the present circumstances, making changes without visible deviations seems the most useful assessment that could be given on the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Traykov] Which was your easiest and your most difficult mission?

[Vulkov] An easier task was to accompany the president. At that time, Dr. Zhelev was the person who had to carry the burden.

There were certain difficulties in all meetings and encounters. Throughout the entire time, I could see questions in the eyes of our partners. We appeared as the representatives of a country that was trying to instill the idea that, from being one of the most loyal satellites of the USSR—at least that is the way we were being referred to—we had become a state that was irreversibly advancing toward democracy.

[Traykov] How many countries did you visit, how many thousands of kilometers did you travel, how many ministers and statesmen did you meet with, and what impressed you about them?

[Vulkov] I have not counted countries, kilometers, or meetings. A great deal has been made of the claim that I

## BULGARIA

JPRS-EER-92-010  
24 January 1992

was frequently absent from the country. An easy calculation would prove that I was away from Bulgaria 80 out of the 320 days as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. Twenty of these were spent in accompanying the president of the Republic. Some people will consider this a great deal, while others will not.

I was pleasantly impressed in the course of my meetings with virtually all ministers whom I had not met previously. I established particularly close relations with my Greek colleague Samaras. I knew him before I became a minister. My contacts with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German minister of foreign affairs, were of an exceptionally practical nature, frank, and, naturally, not without a sense of humor. He is one of the politicians with whom I met most frequently. I also remember the pleasant Italian foreign minister, Gianni De Michelis. I met him for the first time last year, about an hour after I was made BZNS chairman. I was interested in meeting the new foreign minister of the USSR, Boris Pankin. Previously, I had had the opportunity to discuss matters with Bessmertnykh, as well. We had good talks with our two Turkish colleagues, Giray and Alptemocin. We had very frank discussions with our Yugoslav colleague Loncar.

I presume that there is no minister of foreign affairs who is not pleased at having the opportunity to meet and discuss issues with James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State.

I value all of these meetings mainly because, during them, Bulgaria's foreign policy earned a good rating. This is to the credit of the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both at home and abroad. I am convinced of this. Against the background of the strong criticism and various lists and all kinds of steps taken by various authors, some of whom are amateurs while others, as I already mentioned, are cribbers, yet both united by the desire to lower the reputation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this is a consolation, bearing in mind the tremendous qualitative difference between these two groups of people who are issuing such assessments.

[Traykov] You also had a more special type of meeting with the head of the Roman Catholic Church....

[Vulkov] The meeting and discussion with His Holiness Pope John Paul II were different from the other meetings. I was excited by the audience also for special reasons that, for a long time to come, will continue to link the pope in the minds of the public to the so-called notorious Bulgarian trace. I am pleased that, within a single year, the Holy Father received three Bulgarian delegations.

I was also greatly impressed by Constantinos Mitsotakis, the Greek prime minister, whom I met last year during his trip to Bulgaria at the invitation of the BZNS. He is a person who projects a strong aura.

[Traykov] What are your regrets as you leave your position?

[Vulkov] I regret that I am leaving an activity that I engaged in with pleasure. How successful it was I shall let others conscientious people assess.

[Traykov] What pleases you?

[Vulkov] When I took over, I knew I had many friends in the ministry. I hope that, as I leave it, I shall leave behind even more friends. I also hope that a substantial part of the staff of the ministry will continue to work under the new minister as it did.

[Traykov] Do you believe that, to a certain extent, you were able to "lubricate the machine"?

[Vulkov] I think so.

[Traykov] You mentioned your displeasure at parting with an activity that suits you. Will you continue to deal with international affairs as a member of the Standing Committee of the BZNS-e?

[Vulkov] Naturally, I shall direct my efforts in that area, as a member of the Standing Committee. Such activities had been previously neglected. We shall not be able to intensify them very quickly. The international activities of the Agrarian Union are part of the work of the BZNS-e, in which the least we can do is seek ways to be useful. The question whether the most efficient ways of implementing such activities were found in the past is a different matter.

As to the BZNS-e, a great deal more remains to be done, above all on the problem of unification. To the best of my ability, I shall try to contribute to the acceleration of this process.

\* \* \*

Before ending this meeting, Mr. Viktor Vulkov shared with me the view that the government in which he participated consisted of good specialists. He emphasized that, despite the obvious political differences among the individual officials, the work, generally speaking, took place in a pleasant, polite, and intelligent atmosphere. "I have retained and will retain personal friendly relations with almost all of the members of the present Council of Ministers," he said.

**Havel's Statements on Slovakia Challenged**

92CH0237B Bratislava SLOVENSKY NAROD  
in Slovak 16 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Dominik Hudec: "Strange Similarity"]

[Text] We Slovaks have many memorial days. Some we like to remember with love, some we remember with sorrow, others again with hate. And 10 December 1990 will probably be among the kind of memorial days like the one when the Hungarian "statesman" Koloman Tisza declared in the Pest parliament that there is no Slovak nation. Vaclav Havel's speech on 10 December a year ago in the Federal Assembly ended up on a somewhat similar note.

Although the Czech "statesman" did not deny the existence of the Slovak nation, he vehemently denied the Slovaks' right to independence, specifically on the occasion when the law, which demarcates the powers of the governments of the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, and the Federal Government, was being voted on. "There is a danger that the Slovak National Council will declare its own laws to be superior to the laws of the Federal Assembly," he said, and later on "...the Federal Government and I... would have to declare the position of the highest fully legitimate body of one of the republics unconstitutional.... This confrontational situation would mean a de facto breakup of the current constitutional structure of our republic and its result would be the beginning of the breakup of Czechoslovakia (without a hyphen) as a state."

The president was not correct when he said that such a step would be a breach of the constitution, which is still a remnant from the days of communism but nevertheless guarantees each republic the right to leave the federation. Therefore, the Slovak National Council has the constitutional right not only to place its laws above the federal laws, but also the right to legally leave the federation. And the only thing that would happen would be what the nation and its leaders have been striving for these 200 years, and what on 14 March 1939 the Slovak diet unanimously proclaimed. None of the apocalyptic events, which the president then talked about in more detail in his speech, would come to pass.

The state would simply break up, and that would be that! But what would not be nullified, as he further stated in his speech, would be the international recognition of the integrity of our borders. These were not established by the Federal Government but by international treaties in Paris after World War I and in Helsinki after World War II. And the "hundreds of international treaties and the diplomatic relations with other countries" would also be easily resolved. It is therefore also hard to imagine that there would be a country that would not be willing to recognize an independent Slovakia or Czecho [Cesko], or would refuse to conclude any international and trade agreements with them. As far as the economy is concerned, there would be only one substantial change, namely, that Czechs would no longer be able to "lose

money" in Slovakia according to their own plans. Slovakia would lose or make money on its own. It would become evident, as it did in 1939, that Slovakia is economically a highly active state with all the attributes of economic prosperity when it is not hampered by bureaucrats and exploited by the Prague powers that be.

Slovakia will prove that it is a politically, economically, and strategically solid component of the new Europe based on democratic principles, and that it has all the prerequisites for building a solid, reformed economy both internally and externally, and that following the restoration of its independence it will become a reliable partner of all its neighbors, not excluding Czecho. It is literally a phantasmagoria that Slovak independence would "...stop all efforts for political, economic, and security integration of an all-European nature...." That it would "mean a descent into a deep economic and social crisis, if not a veritable economic collapse... as well as an end to democracy in the Czech lands as well as in Slovakia." We do not know about Czecho, but in Slovakia, given its social composition and its centuries-old traditions, any system other than a democratic one is unthinkable! And an economic collapse in Slovakia is today being caused precisely by the Czechs. Only its independence can save it from that!

The president's assertion that 70 percent of Slovaks are against independence is altogether unsubstantiated. A referendum on this question, which he mentioned, would be the best step. That is, without the well-known Czech "buck-passing", for which they cleverly set the Slovaks up even during the so-called free elections. Mr. Havel is right when he says: "Enacting a defense law to use the army for defending constitutionality certainly does not seem to us a good way to go." But he is not right when he demands a law on expanding the powers of the president, by which he wants to become a totalitarian dictator in order to force Slovaks to stay within the framework of the state which they do not want, which harms them, and which negotiates with Budapest behind their back and agitates against them whenever it can. Such nonsensical federation cannot last long. Not even Mr. Havel may pay back for the dollars which were given to him and his people at one time by a Hungarian millionaire by promising the Hungarians southern Slovakia with its vitally important communications, oil pipes, and the Gabcik power plant. Neither Zitny Island nor Kosice will become Hungarian, just as Uzhorod, Hluz, or Subotica will not be Hungarian. The president must know that if there is a change of borders of the Trianon Hungary, then most likely the borders of the Versailles Czecho in Sudetenland will also be changed! And that is not what any Czech, or a Czech president wants to, or even can, achieve by his anti-Slovak policy. Only an independent Slovakia with full sovereignty on its entire territory can be a friend and ally of Czecho in good times and bad, in a democratic Europe. Every Czech and every Slovak must realize that, even though their fathers helped abolish independence in 1944. They can atone for this sin only if they take a stand fully and unequivocally in favor of independence.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Miklosko on Slovaks, Czechs, Alienation**

*92CH0257A Bratislava SLOVENSKA NEDELA  
in Slovak 12 Dec 91 pp 1, 3, 11*

[Interview with Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, by Lubos Sveton; place and date not given: "True to Oneself and to God"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

[Sveton] There is much talk today about alienation—historical, and the cultural that flows from it. Don't you think that in this connection we can also talk about a certain spiritual and religious alienation in Slovakia? Is it not also possible to look for the causes of the small interest that Czech society has in being Czech, or, as the case may be, Moravian—but there the situation is somewhat different—in the fact that they are more lukewarm toward religion?

[Miklosko] At this time Slovakia is something of a question mark for me. In my book which was recently published, I show in statistics that at the time when European nations allowed themselves to be misled by the utopia of a socially just society that was called communism, it was small Slovakia, looked down upon by most everybody, which found an unbelievably correct historic direction. It did not hesitate, it knew where the north was. It will be forever our pride that in the last free elections in Slovakia in 1946 the Communists lost. And that was at a time when they already had the security forces in their hands and the first heinous crimes committed during interrogations on their conscience.

In Slovakia today the individual parties are so antagonistic toward each other that I cannot even imagine a greater political factionalism. Therefore I do not know whether it would even be possible to form some other coalition from the parties represented in the parliament today, a coalition made up of two or three parties which would form a stable government not at odds with itself. The fact that the people are feeling insecure because of increasing unemployment, prices, and rents, is understandable and justified.

But I am really at a loss how to deal with the almost passionate splintering of the public on the question of the state setup. When on 28 October I accompanied President Vaclav Havel to the podium, and eggs were flying, quite a few of them, which the security guards had to catch in their hands, they did not have as much effect on me as the atmosphere below the podium; it was as if two parts of one nation stood there facing each other, separated by a bottomless abyss and hatred. When I later mentioned that to the President, he remarked that the situation is coming to a head. It is as if one nation does not know what it wants. Statistics say that the majority of it is in favor of a common state. But the same majority wants sovereignty. Others want an independent state at any cost, and still others a confederation. And all that is taking place in an atmosphere of rancor and fear. Not even a mother can understand a child who is mute.

Where, then, to look for the causes of our present alienation? I have been thinking about that a lot lately. The first cause is probably a certain tradition of history; although Slovakia has had its own culture and religion ... its capital during the Hungarian period was outside its territory. Everyone who wanted to exert some important influence on life in Slovakia, I am thinking mostly about the intelligentsia, had to somehow adapt, assimilate, and, maybe even though not in his heart, at least outwardly divest himself of his national character. Throughout our history, therefore, there is a chasm that winds between the intelligentsia, the class that gives direction, searches for ways for its nation, and between those who have been its nurturing soil. Maybe that is why the nation existed so expressively in its yearnings, maybe that is why we have so many folk songs. There were few who gave form to those yearnings, although, fortunately, always during decisive historic situations. But continuity was lacking.

And thus a unified consciousness could not form, and today we feel it especially strongly. To overcome this chaos a new intelligentsia will have to grow up. Intelligentsia at one with this nation and European at the same time. Therefore to rectify this historic defect, if that is still possible, Slovakia needs some time. I saw in Poland, as well as in Hungary, how the intelligentsia defended the people and their interests.

If we in Slovakia want to somehow coexist, we cannot create a state in which one part of the population will initiate an armed conflict. After all, the Slovak National Uprising was not just an uprising against fascism, but also an uprising that again identified itself with the idea of Czechoslovakia. That means, that it brought down something that another part of the population favored. In an atmosphere where the part of the population that would not be satisfied with the solution of the state setup threatens sabotage, a politician does not have an easy life. The solution must be such that everybody feels at home here.

But Czech society, too, seems to me to be unbelievably alienated, drifting. First, it was Czechoslovakist, but that model failed. Then it was procommunist, but that failed too, and so it turned anticommunist. I consider as the most conspicuous manifestation of its present uprootedness the almost religious worship of the civic principle. I think that it is again only a matter of time before this civic principle fails. This new framework, the Czech society thinks, is to solve all the problems. Although I do not want to come right out and say that the logical consequence of the civic principle could be a certain form of unitarism or centralism, it is obvious that this is a mistake that does not even appear anywhere else. However, I can imagine a civic-national principle. Europe has been and is constructed as a Europe of nations. Of course, when some nation wants to elevate its nationality above the other nations, that gives rise to racism and fascism. But it is precisely the combination of the civic and the national principle that creates equality of all peoples without regard to nationality, yet still

allows them to retain their local color, historic traditions, charisma. And precisely because Czech society is also alienated, I think that we still very much need each other.

[Sveton] But why does Czech society still remind us of the era of the Slovak State?

[Miklosko] In 1987, therefore still during the totalitarian regime, more than 300 leading Slovak intellectuals issued a statement on the question of Jewish deportations. We had nothing but trouble because of it. The first proclamation of the Slovak parliament following the free elections was a statement on the Jewish deportations. The second proclamation dealt with the deportations of Carpathian Germans. We are still too aware of that inherited burden of mistakes and crimes of ours. But it bothers me that when some people appear to want to solve their own problems by pointing out the problems of others. Everybody should solve their own traumas. Yes, about 70,000 Jews were deported from Slovakia and did not come back, and the remaining ones left for Israel after the war. Today the Jewish community here comprises only a few people. This crime we shall carry with us to the end of our history.

But on this occasion I would like to point out that 250,000 Jews were deported from the Czechoslovak territory during the period of World War II. It would be certainly interesting to ask whether it was just the German soldiers who deported them from the territory of the Protectorate, and whether institutions, intellectuals, or church representatives took a stand on the issue. Then there is the problem of the 2.5 million Germans deported after the war with knapsacks on their backs, and also the problem of several tens of thousands of people who perished and were murdered without trials on the streets, in concentration camps, prisons. Czech society, too, will have to deal with all that whether it wants to or not. And since these deportations and murders on the streets took place at the time when Benes was president, and since today they are naming streets in Prague for him and putting up his statues, I must ask myself what is some people's idea about coming to terms with their history. It is curious that whatever takes place in Slovakia is immediately called a rebirth of clerofascism, but naming a street for Benes is a manifestation of democracy. We must deal with our difficulties in Slovakia ourselves. I think it would be helpful if Czech society, too, would spend more time looking after its own problems.

[Sveton] In April of this year at the International Congress on Humanizing Health Care in Bratislava, Cardinal Jozef Tomko gave the introductory address. He said among other things: "Today it is already a scientific thesis, rather than only a simple hypothesis, that Western civilization finds itself in a period of decline, following which there will be a change and a new type of civilization will appear." Does it not mean that in this sense joining Europe means joining a different kind of decline than the one which we experienced here?

[Miklosko] Recently I read in the journal STREDNA EVROPA an article called "End of History," in which the author, Fukuyama, describes the present as epochal, because in this century the Western liberal society crushed all the revolutionary isms, for whose vision people died as ardent revolutionaries or "inevitable sacrifices." The Western society moves on, and I now have the opportunity to see with my own eyes that there is order, peace, and cleanliness there. It makes us all somewhat envious. It is precisely the colorful places, intimate nooks where one can sit down, rest and chat, that we are longing for.

On the other hand, this society with its social order that makes it possible to express oneself and offers certain pleasures, stands before us as if with empty hands and uneasy. Just when the satisfaction of human needs, opportunities, and freedom is at its apex, Western society finds itself in a spiritual blind alley. It waits for somebody or something that will show it a new direction. A French priest told me about his feeling that French society is beginning to turn to the church, to traditions, where it is looking for solutions. After all, the growing movements are also a manifestation of the search for a solution to the danger by young people in the West. It is noteworthy that just at this time, at the beginning of the nineties, the Pope announced the program Evangelization 2000. The idea of a new evangelization looks to me downright prophetic. The Pope emphasizes: Europe will either be Christian in the third millennium, or it will not be at all. The goal of Evangelization 2000 is to prepare Europe for entry into the next millennium. We all await it with a kind of inner piety. Just as everyone celebrates the coming of the New Year in his own way (it is one of the few civil holidays with a great spiritual dimension), the turn of a century, and especially a millennium, is usually an occasion to engage in even deeper thought. For us today it is important whether we shall be able to absorb the experiences of the spiritual development of the West and learn from them, or whether we, too, will have to walk down the same road in the spiritual sphere as the West did these past years. Just as the experience of communism became the experience of the West as well, and the West sobered up, so we, too, should use the offered opportunity to understand that hand in hand with the material wealth the spiritual wealth must also be developed. If we were to forget that, we would just go from one decline to another.

[Sveton] If today someone says that there were also positive elements in the former regime, that it would be a pity not to keep them even now, that not everything was just black, there is a tendency to label him the "old structure", an unrepented leftist. What kind of position do you take on the issue of left and right in our political spectrum, what is leftist and what is rightist? Often all those who are in favor of a nationalism as the pillar of the Slovak republic are considered leftists. You, too, stress the necessity of emphasizing the national element in our life—does that mean that you are a leftist?

[Miklosko] I think that in all those concepts—leftist-rightist, national-nonnational, confusion reigns here, an initial simplification. In Slovakia it has its specifics. It was to be expected that the national problem will arise here, I have written about it already in Dr. Carnogusky's samizdat BRATISLAVSKE LISTY. The other side of the problem is who is making use of this issue. Many who previously joined the Communist Party for career reasons are trying to make use of the nationalist wave in order to climb even higher. That is the way the leftist stream entered the national stream. But that does not at all mean that the national stream is a priori a leftist stream. After all, even the Christian Democratic Movement, which certainly has nothing in common with the old structures, has within it a national program, but at the same time also a certain fear of liberal capitalism, because it would not guarantee sufficient social security for the people. In this respect that is also a kind of national outline. According to statistics, the majority of Slovakia's population is also in favor of some social guarantees. This has also its historic reasons—on one hand we were brought up to be independent, on the other hand we were always an appendage of someone who always somehow took care of us. Social guarantees are already an immanent part of our national character. But even this is not a leftist element. It would be difficult today to imagine countries with more social guarantees than Holland, Germany, Sweden, or Belgium—and those are not leftist countries. In Holland the Christian Democratic Party continues in power, in Germany the last several years.... And to all that I would like to add that our social conscience stems partly from the religious disposition of the Slovak man. Coldblooded capitalism without a social dimension goes counter to Christian conscience, which is characteristic of the Slovak whether he is religious or not.

In this sense then, the terms left or right do not mean what they do in the West. Even there they are now beginning to abandon those terms. It is questionable whether the Austrian socialists are strictly leftist.

[Sveton] Unemployment is growing faster in Slovakia than in Bohemia and Moravia, and it is not just the enterprises which are converting that are in trouble. Cheaper butter and milk are coming to Slovakia from the Czech lands.... Are we just inept, or is more than that behind it? Some in Slovakia insist that such disproportions would best be remedied by separating the economies.... Is it possible that the negative trend will progress so far that even you will find yourself in the ranks of the unemployed?

[Miklosko] The problems we are experiencing have many causes. First, there is the unfortunate structure of Slovak enterprises. The threat to the electronic and knitting industries is no secret, and enterprises which are undergoing conversion are in jeopardy. The second problem is the very activity of people who are at the head of the enterprises. Some enterprises, thanks to some skillful people, have succeeded—for example, the East

Slovakia Steel Mills, the National Enterprise for Sale of Leather Goods and Footwear in Bardejov, Gumarne [Rubber Factory] Puchov.

During every visit abroad we carry with us a list of enterprises which would need help from outside. In Baden-Wurttemberg they told us clearly that such help will be hard to get from the government. In the entire Western economy, governments only make rules, otherwise the power rests with enterprises and their owners. But in Baden-Wurttemberg they are ready to organize some kind of a trade day for our enterprises, so that they could meet with representatives of the local enterprises.

The third problem is the problem of the influx of foreign capital. I have already spoken about that to some extent. The world of foreign capital is tough, Western businessmen are not a charitable organization. But sometimes I have a feeling that they often come here to exploit our situation by proposing deals which for us, to put it politely, are unacceptable.

One thing is certain—we must remain a socialist state, we must always know how to guarantee the minimum. But above all, we must extricate ourselves out of our present situation by our own efforts. A Slovak has one characteristic that is at once good and bad. He needs an example. As soon as someone builds himself a nice house in the village, immediately others follow. Our people abroad succeeded very well precisely in the entrepreneurial and business sphere. We did not have as strong an intellectual exile group as the Czechs had, but many Slovaks have been successful abroad as small and medium-size entrepreneurs. Therefore I believe that our problems are really only temporary. A few examples will suffice to break down the misgivings of the people about engaging in business, and Slovakia could then become a country of the small and medium-size entrepreneur, a very successful country. For example, the previously mentioned Baden-Wurttemberg, which is 80 percent based on small and medium-size businesses, belongs among the richest lands in Germany.

[Sveton] Even though it is not certain that in contrast to last year there will be enough Christmas trees this year, everyone already has his own wish about what he wants to find under the tree even before he starts looking for it. What is your wish, if it is not a secret?

[Miklosko] After two years, the unity of 17 November is already illusory. My wish of what to have under this year's Christmas tree therefore is the fulfillment of one great personal desire. The desire to prevail through this temporary period, to prevail by applying all the strength we can muster. None of us expected that this period will be so hard economically as well as spiritually. We are comparing with trepidation our present situation with that in the West. We are comparing the incomparable. The Western countries arrived at their present situation by 40 years of hard, purposeful, and well thought-out work. In Germany, as the local deputies told me, they

lived even in the sixties with two or three children and a wife in a single room. And that is why I have such a wish for my Christmas gift.

### Common State in Light of Sociological Research

92CH0248A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak  
10 Dec 91 pp 6-7

[Article by Zora Butorova and Tatiana Rosova: "Independent and Democratic?"]

[Text] Two years after November 1989, before the first act of the drama in which the cards of the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks are being dealt anew is played out, many questions are in order: What kind of regime will replace real socialism in Slovakia in the near future? Will not the attempt to break the vicious circle of communism building end in a new form of authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism—this time in a nationalist guise? Can the preservation of a common state help to avert this danger? To what extent has the corrosion of the resolve to build a common Czech-Slovak state already begun to appear in Slovakia? What value orientation characterizes the categories of the population who support the idea of a federation in a new partnership? What do people who are inviting the breakup of the state emphasize?

#### A New National Front?

These questions must be publicly answered today, when, especially in Slovakia, there is a danger that the actions of the political representation will get out of the control of those whom it is supposed to represent, that decisions will be implemented which will run counter not only to long-term interests but even to the actual state of the general public's mind. This is precisely the time to take a critical look and determine the extent to which the validity of various politically motivated assertions is accepted, assertions which usually make reference to an historical and sociocultural difference between the Slovak and Czech societies and often in a downright totalitarian spirit call for Slovakia to unite in the common "national interest"—in some kind of new "National Front."

Behind the hesitant or openly dismissive attitude toward the preservation of the common state are a number of arguments which can be rejected *prima faciae*. The first accentuates the long-standing plebeian status of the Slovaks, their wretchedness and the injustices done to them. The second ideological justification of the efforts aimed at disintegration is suggested by the vision of the Slovak nation as a community of deeply religious, by the decades of communism building untouched people, who must be protected from the insidious Western liberalism which is infiltrating into Slovakia also through the Czech Republic. The third argument points out the historic continuity of the long standing efforts by Slovaks to achieve an independent state, and, disregarding its content, highlights its fulfillment in Tiso's Slovak State. In

the fourth version the Slovaks need an independent state so that they can continue to build something on the order of socialism. The common feature of all these arguments is the absolutizing of the differences while neglecting the kinship, which leads to conclusions about the inevitable divergence of the Czech and Slovak societies. As a rule, in all instances there follows the statement about the last historic opportunity to set out—by constitutional or less than constitutional means—on the irreversible, historically predetermined road to building one's own national state.

A group of Slovak and Czech sociologists attempted at their meeting in Alsovice to summarize the reasons for preserving the common state. In the final report they spoke about geopolitical and security reasons, about reasons of historical continuity, sociocultural, material and economic reasons, as well as those connected with the process of European integration. We shall try to bolster these reasons, which according to our opinion have not lost their validity, by empirical arguments about the attitudinal differentiation of the population in Slovakia, as they are indicated by the results of the sociological research at the Institute For Social Research of the Komensky University in Bratislava. Our research had a representative character, and was carried out in October 1990 on a sample of about 3,900 adults in the CSFR; in March 1990 on a sample of 400, and in May and July 1990 on a sample of 1,000 respondents from Slovakia.

#### I, a Citizen of CSFR

During the decades of coexistence a broad spectrum of personal contacts and ties between Czechs and Slovaks has developed. According to our findings from October 1990, 23 percent of the citizens of the Czech Republic [CR] have relatives of Slovak origin, as many as 45 percent have Slovak friends, and 33 percent come into contact with their colleagues from Slovakia in the course of their work. Thirty-one percent of citizens of the Slovak Republic [SR] have relatives who come from the Czech lands, 57 percent have friends there, and 30 percent come into contact with colleagues from the Czech lands in course of their work.

Undoubtedly thanks also to this rich network of linkages the nationalist campaign has been unsuccessful in disrupting the strong sense of belonging together on the part of both nations. The conviction that "in spite of all the misunderstandings the Czechs and the Slovaks are bound together by friendly ties which must not be severed" is retained by approximately 80 percent of the SR citizens (data from October 1990 and May 1991).

Contrary to the impression which can quite logically appear on the Czech side, especially when following the media, the majority of Slovaks do not rate their national identity higher than their civic identity. According to the conviction of almost 80 percent of SR citizens, people should put as much store on being a CSFR citizen as they

do on their nationality (data from October 1990; as many as 90 percent of CR citizens feel the same way).

As repeated studies by many institutions show, the will to remain in one state unit continues to predominate: The share of proponents of an independent state does not exceed one-fifth despite a moderate increase, and the share of proponents of a confederation another one-tenth. Therefore, an independent Slovak Republic could come into being in the very near future despite the wishes of the majority of SR citizens. This act would be an expression of the failure of democratic mechanisms that enable citizens to express their real will.

#### A Mirror of Self-Criticism Is Lacking

But in spite of the overwhelming feeling that they belong together, the attitude of the Slovaks toward the Czechs is characterized by great mistrust and a feeling of being wronged, a frustration of a "younger brother" who feels unjustly underestimated and disadvantaged; according to our studies, 75 percent of SR respondents suspect the Czechs of not treating them as equal partners; 60 percent are convinced that Slovaks are being exploited by the Czechs. In the eyes of a third of the adult SR citizens, Czechs are seen unequivocally in a negative light; in the eyes of this group the stereotype of a Czech is most often a calculating egoist, who, in contrast to the industrious Slovak, prefers idle philosophizing over honest work, and considers himself to be somehow a cut above.

But at issue is not only how the other one is viewed; at issue is also self-evaluation, the understanding of the character of one's own nation. As our research of October 1990 showed, Slovaks differ from the Czechs by being substantially less self-critical, which in one third of them borders on veritable national smugness or self-admiration. While in the statements of the Czech respondents about Czech national character critical judgment predominated, among Slovaks emphasis on national virtues, especially industriousness, was the dominant theme.

The inhabitants of the Czech Republic are more sensitively aware of the moral devastation which marked the everyday life of the society and relationships among people; they particularly blame themselves for excessive adaptability and subordination to undemocratic regimes.

On the other hand, the SR population accepted the democratic traditions of the First Czechoslovak Republic as their own to a much lesser degree; on the contrary, it emphasizes only oppression and exploitation of Slovaks during that period. It also takes a much less critical attitude toward the building of communism as well as toward the period of normalization; it identifies itself less with the changes following 17 November 1989. These differences undoubtedly are connected with a lesser awareness of the societal decay and a less widespread recognition of the inevitable radical social changes in Slovakia during normalization.

We consider especially serious the finding that only a third of the Slovak population is critical of the period of the Slovak State. Another third has an ambiguous attitude toward it, and one third even glorifies it, if only for the single fact that it fulfilled Slovak statehood, as well as because of the relatively high standard of material consumption enjoyed by the population. This worrisome state of social consciousness in Slovakia shows that Slovak society has not reached a consensus based on the condemnation of the wrongs and crimes of the past and on sharing the values of human rights and humanity.

It is symptomatic that the most negative attitude toward the Czech nation and Czechoslovak coexistence is held by people who have a favorable opinion of Tiso's Slovak Republic and those who consider the Slovak National Uprising a senseless act against one's own state.

#### Together, But How?

But it is not only the arguments about old historical wrongs that are reflected in the quite widespread feeling of having been wronged and exploited, but also the interpretation of the economic transformation as Prague's tool for suppressing Slovaks' national interests, an interpretation that has become entrenched in Slovakia to a considerable extent. In May 1991, 44 percent of SR citizens expressed their conviction that one of the consequences of the economic reform will be the suppression of Slovakia's national interests, and 77 percent are afraid that Slovakia will have unequal status within the CSFR framework.

It is precisely the fear the unequal status of Slovakia will persist that can explain the attractiveness of the slogans about Slovak sovereignty, mostly not specified in more detail. When rank and file citizens are not asked to ponder the content itself of these demands, to think through their constitutional, economic, or geopolitical consequences—when they are asked to embrace only the principle alone—then the degree of support for these demands is high. In this sense, 46 percent of citizens considered in March 1991 the achievement of the not clearly specified sovereignty of Slovakia very necessary. Two months later, when we asked the respondents whether they would be willing to go on strike if there were the danger of a constitution being adopted that would limit Slovak sovereignty, 68 percent answered positively.

It must be emphasized, however, that the resolve of the SR citizens to support the equalization of rights between both republics still does not mean that they agree with the specific demands of the proposed Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic. Rather on the contrary. The demand for an independent Slovak army was supported by 29 percent and rejected by 64 percent of those asked. Independent financial and monetary policy was approved by 44 percent and 47 percent answered negatively. The supremacy of SR laws was demanded by 31 percent, 42 were against. The greatest support was given to the demand for an independent foreign policy

(54 percent for, 40 percent against); it can be assumed, however, that for some citizens foreign policy means regulation of international or inter-regional relations.

SR citizens have a quite hazy idea not only of what the essence of sovereignty is, but also of the connections between individual forms of the state setup and the realizability of specific demands for power sharing.

At the same time it is becoming clear that the views on power sharing are beginning to show a rather more marked bias toward a decentralized model of the state setup than would seem at first glance based on views on the form of the common state. So, for instance, 30 percent of the proponents of federation demand superiority of SR laws over federation laws. Similarly, some of the federation proponents also demand an independent army and monetary policy. On the other hand, almost one-fourth of the proponents of an independent state reject the idea of an independent army. More such examples of wanting what is incompatible can be offered: inconsistent attitudes are symptomatic of practically half of the adult SR citizens.

#### Connections Under the Surface

If we look at the problem of the continued coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks through the prism of prospects for the development of a true pluralistic market economy—and we consider such prism key—then we must ask ourselves whether and how the attitude of SR citizens toward the state setup coincides with their broader value orientation.

Are people with a different attitude toward the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks also differentiated by their view on economic transformation, principles of parliamentary democracy, and degree of national tolerance? Even though it does not correspond with the proclamations of those who represent the nationalist line, the analysis of the data of our research gives an unequivocally positive answer to this question.

The demands of the declaration of SR sovereignty, or, the idea of independence of the Slovak state, is supported to the greatest extent by those who tend to support the principles of a socialist economy and a "populist government," and who are characterized by a high intolerance toward not only the Czechs but also toward the members of national and other minorities (Hungarians, Jews, Gypsies). These comprise approximately one-fourth (26 percent) of the population. An opposite and practically equally represented value stream (27 percent) is comprised of nationally tolerant people who accept the principles of parliamentary democracy and are convinced proponents of a functional federation, or, as the case may be, a unitary state. Almost half of SR citizens (47 percent) fall between these two mentioned poles: even when these people mostly proclaim their support for a common state, they nevertheless do not systematically reject the demands of the declaration on SR sovereignty.

Interconnection of the values of preserving a common state, parliamentary democracy, national tolerance, and market economy is documented by the typology of attitudes as shown by the analysis of empirical data.

Among the most convinced proponents of the common state are two types of people: first, a group of consummate proponents of a radical economic reform, and second, a group of people with an ambivalent attitude toward its scenario. People in the first group, liberals (11 percent), are characterized by an altogether extraordinary life-long activism. Among them we find most of the proponents of privatization and the introduction of foreign capital. They hold an optimistic view of the long-term economic, social, and ecological consequences of the reform, as well as of the possibility of satisfying Slovaks' national interests. They are most emphatic in rejecting the communist regime, and emphasize the danger of the continued influence of State Security, KGB, and the old mafias. The other type of unequivocal proponents of a common state are people with a social democratic orientation (16 percent). These people as a rule do not profess to belong to a party of that name, but we called them social democrats because of their views. They are somewhat less critical of the communist regime than the liberals, but by and large they nevertheless support the present regime. They are afraid of the social impact of the economic changes, as well as of privatization and introduction of foreign capital into large enterprises and the service sphere.

In the broad, ambivalent center we find two types. The first one includes people with no clearly defined views (19 percent), particularly older and less educated people, who exhibit the weakest understanding of current events whether they concern the economic reform, principles of political life, or relations between nations and nationalities in the CSFR. The second category are the nationalists (28 percent). They are considerably distrustful and wary of members of other nations or nationalities, and evaluate Slovak abilities with greater self-confidence. They emphasize the wrongs done to the Slovak nation during all the periods of Czecho-Slovak history. They explain their reservations about the economic reform mainly by their fear that Slovak interests will be threatened. However, they are not extreme nationalists, and are distinguished from the radical antiparliamentarians mainly by lesser militancy.

A closer look at this group indicates that these are people whose views are not deeply rooted but rather are the product of the campaign that exploits the feeling of social insecurity. It can be assumed that this group is not *a priori* closed to rational and comprehensible arguments for Czech-Slovak coexistence. But the high number of people with ambivalent, not strongly defined, or outright inconsistent views on key questions about the future direction of Slovak society carries with it not only hope but danger as well: it does not, in fact, exclude the possibility that their views will take a turn in the opposite direction if they continue to be exposed to the onslaught of the nationalist propaganda.

The proponents of an independent state, or SR sovereignty, are most often found among two types of people: radical antiliberalists (11 percent) and nationalist antiparliamentarians (15 percent). Radical antiliberalists are people with the most pronounced antireformist and prosocialist, or, better said procommunist, orientation; they reject on principle everything that the social changes after November 1989 have brought. They prefer an independent state without harking back to the traditions of Tiso's Slovak republic: from its establishment they expect mainly a chance to return to real socialism. Although the nationalist antiparliamentarians are less consistent in rejecting a radical economic reform, they form a group that is the least tolerant toward other nationalities, that identifies most emphatically with the traditions of the Slovak State and Tiso, and unequivocally leans toward the leader principle and extraparliamentary methods of pressure.

The fact that challenging, or, as the case may be, rejecting, a common state finds the greatest response in people of antiparliamentary, antireformist, procommunist orientations, people least tolerant of other nationalities, increases the probability of a catastrophic scenario of developments in Slovakia following a possible breakup of the state—plunging Slovakia into the realm of political instability, economic backwardness, infringements of human rights, and moral confusion.

**People's Party Supports Relations With Ruthenia**  
*92CH0250A Prague LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE in Czech*  
*18 Dec 91 p 5*

[Article by Jaromír Horec: "Subcarpathian Ruthenia at the Crossroads"]

[Text] For Ruthenia this month began with the referendum on Ukraine's independence and with presidential elections, to which a third question was added specifically for that particular area: "Do you opt for the status of an autonomous self-government?" The response to that question meant a great victory for all patriotic forces currently united in the Democratic League of Nationalities.

To date it was a culmination of a long and strenuous effort to start Ruthenia on a path toward a new life within an independent Ukraine. Now everything depends on the population of Subcarpathian Ruthenia as well on the way the Ukrainian government will meet the nation's demands for its future progress. Its first steps will be judged according to the way it treats the nationalities living in that country and whether it safeguards their right of self-determination.

During the discussions of Czechoslovak foreign policy in the Federal Assembly of the CSFR, the chairman of the CSL [Czechoslovak People's Party], Josef Lux, presented an well-informed analysis of the situation in Subcarpathian Ruthenia whose name was thus mentioned in our parliament for the first time in 45 years. Last week the CSL Central Committee also took up the issue of

Subcarpathian Ruthenia. As known, in 1945 the Provisional National Assembly acted under coercion and therefore, contrary to the law when it voted for compulsory annexation of that region to Stalin's Soviet Union. Lux's address in the parliament was preceded by his expert analysis of that issue, and amended with a number of proposals—to establish a consulate and a cultural center in Uzhgorod; to intensify economic relations; to expand the Ruthenian-language television and radio broadcast; to dispense with visas, and so on. Due to the passivity in the Cernin Palace, Hungary is in many ways already well ahead of us.

Arguments that are often heard both from the Cernin Palace and from the advisers in the Castle refer to the Helsinki Accords on Security in Europe, but they are irrelevant. To be sure, according to a report by the CSTK [Czechoslovak Press Agency], the chief of the Czechoslovak diplomatic service recently stated that "Czechoslovakia is bound by international conventions" (which ones?), and therefore, he "did not think that the redrawing of its borders could resolve the problem of Subcarpathian Ruthenia." However, no international agreement prevents Czechoslovakia from initiating negotiations with Ukraine about the future of the Subcarpathian Ruthenia which was from 1919 to 1939 part of the Czechoslovak Republic by the decision of the peace conference in Saint Germain. Indeed, unless the Cernin Palace intends to honor the illegal pact drafted by the Kremlin in 1945, there is no agreement that could prevent us from reopening the issue of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. As far as the Helsinki Accords are concerned, although they say that borders must not be changed, at the same time they state quite explicitly that "all European problems must be settled in agreement, peacefully, and without any violence." Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, whose borders were changed, and even Germany, where an entire state, the GDR, had disappeared from the map, legitimately proceeded from that particular premise. New borders were drawn in the Baltic countries and at the same time, all three states were admitted to the membership in the Helsinki accords on cooperation and security in Europe. That is the true spirit of Helsinki.

Furthermore, some views voiced in our parliament called us not to "irritate Ukraine which is a nuclear superpower" by presenting legitimate arguments concerning the future development of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Such standpoints are needlessly alarmist and unacceptable in relations among independent states.

The Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the successor of a similar organization in our first republic, held an assembly on 7 December. It hailed the victory of the referendum, and heard reports presented by the Ruthenian delegates, by the spokesmen of the Ruthenians from east Slovakia, by the deputies and representatives of the Association of Freedom Fighters, whose membership includes also many Ruthenians who had fought in World War II. The assembly accepted with particular appreciation Dr. B. Svoboda's report about his recent fact-finding trip in the Subcarpathian region,

as well as the memorandum drafted by the CSL for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It proposes, among other things, a discussion about the future of that area, including its potential return to the CSFR. Indeed, we should discuss the Subcarpathian Ruthenia: with consideration as well with determination, and above all, freely.

**Writer Claims Ruthenians Prefer Independence**  
*92CH0236A Prague PRACE in Czech 14 Dec 91 p 1*

[Article by Eva Bombova and Michal Korol: "Hell or Heaven?"]

[Excerpt] On Sunday, the first day of December, 37 statutory voters were preparing for an especially meaningful event—participation in a national referendum in which they would express their opinion concerning the independence of Ukraine, and at the same time, elect its president. The voters in the region of Transcarpathia were facing yet another task—to decide whether they do, or do not, want self-government for their territory. Today we already know that 90 percent of the voters had cast their ballot for an independent Ukrainian state and 60 percent of them elected L. Krawchuk, a 57-year-old former party ideologue, to be their president. Furthermore, 78 percent of the people in Transcarpathia opted for self-government. However, self-government is a rather broad concept. What does it mean to the citizens of a country so dear to us? In fact, how do the people live there now, after 46 years of separation from Czechoslovakia? How do they envision their future? With all those questions we traveled in recent days across our eastern border to Transcarpathian Ukraine.

**The Struggle for Independence**

"First of all: Do not say 'Transcarpathian Ukraine,'" Vasil Sochka, the chairman of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians in Uzhgorod, said emphatically at the beginning of our conversation. "That's what they call us," he said pointing somewhere in a distance, "they, the Ukrainians. But we do not live beyond the Carpathian Mountains; we live on their southern hills. We are Subcarpathian Ruthenians. Our nation has lived here for centuries, and believe me—never before, with the exception of the past 46 years—had it been part of a territorial union with the Ukrainians. First we lived together with

the Hungarians and then in harmony with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nevertheless, we had always maintained our identity—we have our own intelligentsia, our literary traditions, our past and current culture, and our patriotic feelings. Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians recognize our existence. If they would admit that the Ruthenians do exist, they would also have to recognize Subcarpathian Ruthenia as an independent territory, which is something they would never do." That is how we got acquainted with Sochka, a Ruthenian writer and former highschool professor. This energetic 69-year-old man is fighting like a lion for the recognition of his nation. "Subcarpathian Ruthenia has a territory of 12,900 square kilometers with a population of 1.26 million, 800,000 of them Ruthenians, 160,000 Hungarians, 10,000 Slovaks, 8,000 Germans, 28,000 Romanians, 5,000 Gypsies-Romanys, and the rest Ukrainians and Russians," continued Professor Sochka. "However, the Ukrainians hold almost exclusively all key positions in administrative offices. For that reason the third question in the referendum, which was intended for the citizens of Subcarpathian Ruthenia alone, was originally formulated in quite a different way: We wanted an autonomy for Subcarpathia, and all that goes with it. In the end, due to the timidity of our deputies and to the pressure from Kiev, the people could vote only for self-government. And don't think that I am just playing with words. In fact, because the concept of self-government is so broad, I am afraid that in the end the Ukrainians will not grant us any of our demands—neither a local government nor Ruthenian television and radio broadcast, and least of all, the right to make decisions about our affairs in our own country. To make a long story short, we have to go on fighting.

"We appreciate the support from Ruthenian organizations abroad—Ruthenian Renewal in Slovakia, and the Society of the Friends of Subcarpathian Ruthenia in Bohemia. The chairmen of both of those organizations, Vasil Turok from Presov, and the author and journalist Dr. Jaromir Horec from Prague, respectively, are among our dearest friends—together with members of other nations, the Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Germans, with whom we have established the Democratic League of Nationalities. Our goal is independence for Subcarpathian Ruthenia," added Professor Sochka in conclusion to our discussion in Uzhgorod. [passage omitted]

**Statements of MDF's Liberal, Populist Factions**

*92CH0231B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 17 Dec 91 p 8*

[Article by A.J.Sz.: "Liberal and Populist-National Positions"]

[Text] The MDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum] liberal workshop and its populist-national circle issued position papers just prior to the party's fifth national congress. The liberal analysis details the MDF's past and analyzes the causes of today's concerns. Its most important finding is that while before the elections the MDF has indeed represented a calm force, it "manifests calm only when it has no reason to do so, and shows strength where it should not" since it took power. The populist-national circle does not project a retrospective view, it includes no critique of the party's activities. The populist-national circle deals mainly with the present in its position paper. Differences and similarities between the two intellectual trends can best be seen from discussions of political and economic issues. The liberals did not designate a first class, paramount value, while the populist-national group attributed primacy to national values.

Liberals view the administration of justice as a completed fact based on laws that have already been enacted, while the populist-national group regards this matter as the key to the system change and wants to see a more firm, better paced administration of justice. Both groups regard the protection of the poor and middle strata, and the enhancement of middle-class development as matters of fundamental importance.

The liberal workshop stressed the need to distribute the public burden, while the populist-national group emphasized the need to build a social safety net. The liberals expect to hear a more staid political discourse and to have the party pursue a more deliberate press policy, while members of the circle advocate a more consistent system change.

Both platforms are identical insofar as they claim that all intellectual workshops of the MDF must jointly formulate the party's political profile in the future. But while the liberal workshop urges the development of a new program and a new political strategy, the populist-national circle fully supports "definite changes in the pursuit of the system change."

**SZDSZ, Smallholders' Parliamentary Group Meet**  
*92CH0231D Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 17 Dec 91 p 5*

[MTI report: "Alliance of Free Democrats and the Smallholders' 33 Meet"]

[Text] Following a change in the person of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] party chairman and in the person of the faction leader, a group of SZDSZ representatives headed by Marton Tardos paid a visit to the

33-member FKgP [Smallholders Party] faction on Monday at noon, prior to the opening of the plenary session. Faction leader Gyula Pasztor and deputy faction leaders Istvan Borocz and Sandor Olah represented the Smallholders negotiating delegation, while the SZDSZ delegation was represented by Peter Kadar and Gyula Gaal. A joint communique issued after the introductory meeting stated that the negotiating parties declared that they were interested in preserving the country's stability and the strengthening of a middle-class Hungary, while maintaining their present roles in the opposition and the coalition respectively. In analyzing the difficulties experienced in the field of agriculture the Smallholders and the Free Democrats discussed major issues related to the budget and the tax laws. The two parties had similar views concerning tax benefits to be granted to agricultural small producers and with respect to facilitating the financing of starting agricultural enterprises. They regarded the streamlined representation of agricultural interests and the effective operation of platforms serving such interests as having decisive significance. It is known that a few days ago the 33 [members of the Smallholders faction] have reached an agreement with Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa concerning their insistence on tax benefits calculated on sales revenues, i.e., that small producers would not be forced to follow bureaucratic requirements. The Minister also promised to the Smallholders to raise the limit of annual gross sales revenues from 500,000 to 700,000 forints. Sales revenues below these threshold amounts will be eligible for tax benefits. New agricultural entrepreneurs will not be required to pay land taxes for three years, according to the second agreement now joined by the Free Democrats. In leaving the meeting Marton Tardos said that negotiations with the 33 Smallholders will continue.

**Tardos Attacks Kupa's Optimism in Debate**

*92CH0240D Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 16 Dec 91 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Graffiti: Kupa's Round With Marton Tardos"]

[Text] Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] faction leader Marton Tardos said that he regarded Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa as an extremist optimist. The statement was made at the public recording session of the television debate "Vital Issues" before a capacity audience in the Vasvar cultural center. As of recent date, the Optimists' Club has been operating in this Vas County small town and so far as we know the finance minister has not been invited to join.

Tardos acknowledged that Kupa's optimism was not without any foundation. He regarded the government's ability to slow down and to manage inflation as a success. On the other hand, economic performance has declined further, the transformation of production has not begun, and the situation of enterprises has not

become stabilized because they did not invest, but instead pursued deficit financing and sold significant capital assets.

Tardos reminded the finance minister of the days when they jointly pondered the tasks of the then future government within the Bridge Group, and when Kupa agreed with Tardos in two respects—matters which he, as finance minister, is slow in implementing. These two matters pertained to the revamping of the budget and to privatization. No budget reform to enable tax reductions and to revitalize entrepreneurial ventures has taken place. Speaking of privatization the SZDSZ faction leader described the situation as scandalous because the State Property Agency [AVU] finds itself in an ex-lex situation and operates in the absence of property policy guidelines.

Mihaly Kupa responded to the problems mentioned by Tardos with the mild arrogance we have become accustomed to hearing from him, claiming that he, too, was dissatisfied with the pace of privatization and that he finally managed to enforce within the Economic Cabinet his own recommendations to accelerate privatization. In regard to budget reform Kupa said that the state household law should have been adopted. This would mean a change in the structure of the state's expenditures, someone else would finance education, health care, and many other things. A number of state functions must be severed; taxes can be reduced only thereafter.

#### **Delay in Adopting 'State Household' Law**

*92CH0271B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 16 Dec 91 p 11*

[Article by Melinda Kamasz: "According to the Proposed Law on the State Household: Budget Must Be Submitted to Parliament by 15 October"]

[Text] It has been clearly revealed in the course of the budget debate that both the government and the opposition parties regard state household reform as one of the most important tasks to be performed. How come parliament has not adopted the legislative proposal on state household reform, a text that has been prepared two years ago? We discussed this matter with Finance Ministry Division Chief Csaba Laszlo, head of the working group that prepared the legislative proposal.

Work on the state household law has been going on for more than two years. The first version of the law had been placed on the table in the summer of 1989, moreover, at the end of that year it has been submitted to parliament for first reading. At that time, however, parliament declined to debate the law on grounds that it did not want to create a law which would significantly influence governmental work in the future. Another revised legislative proposal had been prepared after the system change by November 1990, at that time, however, finance ministers had changed and the submission of the document had been postponed. The new material

was once again complete by spring, it had been presented to parliament in July and representatives began working on the proposal in August.

The substantive content of the law has not changed despite the many revisions. From a professional standpoint it acquired better foundations and more detail was added, according to Csaba Laszlo. It is equally true that in the course of revisions the Finance Ministry tried to tighten the state household system. The added stringency had once again been relaxed in the course of reconciling the law [with various departments and agencies], as for instance, with respect to the business management of institutions. Comments on the proposal urged a return to conditions that prevailed in 1989 and 1990, under which government departments and agencies were free to decide their expenditure objects within their own appropriations. The government did not agree to this concept, in the end.

The need for state household reform has already arisen several years ago, and the development of a state household law is undoubtedly an indispensable part of such reform. And yet, even though the proposal has been submitted to parliament in August, adoption of the proposal is unlikely this year. Parliament is busy debating tax laws and the budget in the final months of the year.

Why is there a need for a state household law at a time when a budget has existed without it and when it appears that there also will be a budget this year, we asked Csaba Laszlo. He responded by saying that the state household law would provide rules for preparing the budget and closing the books, and principles for managing the budget. It contains numerous basic principles, thus, for example the principles of completeness, gross accounting, openness and detail, and the obligation to account for cash flow, all of which had not been required by legal provisions thus far. Whether these rules had been observed by the government was regarded as an internal affair of the government. Incidentally, during the previous decades the various governments have, without an exception, violated each and every one of these principles. For example: Budgets did not provide details, therefore one could not thoroughly understand the budget. The situation in this regard has substantially changed last year: The budget submitted to parliament included far more detail. At that time certain procedural rules—parts of the proposed state household law—were made part of the budget law. But since budgets pertain to individual years, these rules also applied for a single year. Thus, in the absence of a state household law, procedural issues are governed each year by the budget law, and disputes between the government and parliament as to respective authorities, the basis of, and extent to which the government is free to manage and use the money, would have to be renewed each year. This takes away time from dealing with the truly essential issues, i.e., who receives how much money. In theory, at least, unless these rules are provided for by law there is no

assurance that the National Assembly's authority to appropriate funds does not become a formality, the way it has been before.

Considering that next year's budget has been submitted so late—on 29 November—many people may want to know the deadline the government must observe in this regard, as determined by the legislative proposal for the management of the state household. This law would require the government to provide basic budget concepts and parameters to the National Assembly by 31 August, and to submit the legislative proposal on the budget prior to 15 October. And what happens if parliament fails to adopt the budget? A situation like this could present itself this year. The state household management law provides that in such instances a provisional law be submitted to the National Assembly. In the framework of such law, parliament may authorize new appropriations or could discontinue previously existing institutions. Budget debate may continue upon adoption of the provisional law. A so-called ex-lex situation exists if parliament rejects the provisional law. In such instances the National Assembly authorizes the government through the state household law to continue operating based on the previous year's appropriations and on a time-proportionate basis.

The state household law also provides rules for the management of segregated funds, and for financial management in the framework of social security and local governments. It contains only a few novel items regarding social security, detailed requirements will be established in the framework of the social security law. With regard to segregated funds, however, the state household law provides that beginning on 1 January 1993 all segregated funds operating in Hungary must be authorized by law. Incidentally, this requirement demands some thorough preparatory work because a majority of the existing segregated funds have not been authorized by law. In regard to local government financial management the state household law provides that every local government must prepare its budget on time, that lines of authority must be clear, and that representatives must receive minimum information required to the adoption of the budget in a timely fashion. This does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of local governments, because the authority of local governments to manage their finances would not be infringed upon.

The pending state household law is similar to laws that prevail in western market economies, nevertheless, one significant difference exists. In most western countries institutions receive funding after funds have been expended. To put this in very simple terms: under the present Hungarian practice institutions included in the budget have their own accounts and appropriations made pursuant to the budget law are transferred to these accounts on a monthly, time-proportionate basis. Institutions make payments from these accounts. In most countries with market economies, however, budgeted funds are being transferred only at the time when actual payments are due for goods or services procured. This method plays

a particularly important role in the management of liquidity. More time and preparation would be needed to introduce this new method of financing. Undoubtedly, however, the same system will also have to be introduced in Hungary, Laszlo Csaba said in conclusion.

### **Regional Prefect, Budapest Mayor Clash**

*92CH0229C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
17 Dec 91 p 5*

[Interview with Regional Prefect Dr. Peter Szentgyorgyvolgyi by Zsuzsa Pato; place and date not given: "Citizens Must Be Protected"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Just a few days less than a year ago, Dr. Peter Szentgyorgyvolgyi moved to the City Hall building where he, in his capacity as Budapest's regional prefect, guards over the legality of actions taken by the Budapest autonomous governing bodies.

[Pato] In a recent interview granted to this newspaper Lord Mayor Gabor Demszky said that citizens must be protected from the excess power of the state. He understood excess power to mean decentralized institutions, such as the institution of regional prefects. What do you have to say about this?

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] I have two answers, and I will begin with the more refined one: The Lord Mayor did not think through what he was saying when he said that. As a law graduate he should have known that the activities of regional prefects are governed primarily by the Constitution.

My less refined response: Regional prefects protect citizens against the excesses of autonomous local governmental bodies.

[Pato] This response also indicates that there is something to the saying which is frequently mentioned in conjunction with regional prefects: Two musicians are one too many in the same tavern.

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] I never understood what this saying meant, because I do not want to do what the Lord Mayor does. In other words, to stick with this analogy, we are talking about two musicians playing two different instruments.

[Pato] Accordingly, is there room for the two of you?

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] The idea of incompatibility has not even occurred to me. And this question would not even arise if everyone knew what he was doing and concentrated on his own work only.

[Pato] But still, you check, supervise, and watch. Would it not be better for you to perform this function in a building not shared with the Lord Mayor?

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] Why? Why is it unpleasant if someone is being checked. This is work, not scoffing. It's not worth making a prestige issue out of this.

[Pato] Is it conceivable that in the future the Lord Mayor must seek permission from the regional prefect to remain in City Hall?

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] It is conceivable from a legal standpoint, but I would not take advantage of this opportunity.

[Pato] Previously you have appeared very often in public. The press had echoed your comments on legality and the suits you filed in court. Now there is deep silence. Have you tired out in the struggle?

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] Not at all. Only the magic of the novelty of this office has passed by. We are living simple, gray weekdays.

[Pato] Presumably, however, you are repeatedly discrediting yourself on these gray weekdays. At one point a member of the Capital General Assembly made a statement like this with reference to your perennial objections.

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] I, too, have heard of this statement. I was stunned and I was considering whether to initiate legal proceedings against the person who made this statement. But then I decided not to make a prestige issue of this matter, just as I did not make such issues out of many other things.

[Pato] What is your view of the fact that had it not been for the opposition's victory in the local elections there would be no regional prefects at all?

[Szentgyorgyvolgyi] This is a truly erroneous perception that lacks factual foundations, because according to original perceptions the system would not have been one of regional prefects, but the old system of appointed county executives would have been reintroduced. The appointed county executives wielded much stronger authority than today's regional prefects. I believe that it is no coincidence that by the will of the opposition, appointed county executives do not watch over local governments.

#### Media Evaluated in MDF's Internal Newsletter

92CH0231C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 17 Dec 91 p 8

[Unattributed article: "We Could Have More Trouble With the Radio"]

[Text] In a special issue of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] internal newsletter Jozsef Debreczeni has this to say in an article entitled "Needed: Press Policy!": "Television is the most important medium that molds public opinion. The programs of decisive importance (30-40 percent viewer participation), such as political and news programs, A HET, and PANORAMA, could not, under any circumstance, be regarded as antigovernment. (Surely, these programs are under heavy attack

from the opposition.) How about NAPZARTA? With its 3- to 5-percent viewer participation it hardly deserves attention. We have more trouble with the radio. The programs 168 ORA and VASARNAPI UJSAG mutually compensate for each other, but the morning programs, and in general the entire program process, convey more of an antigovernment, biased, and on occasion, a hostile sense."

#### Bankruptcy Law Provisions Analyzed

92CH0270B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
17 Dec 91 p 11

[Article by Karoly Csabai: "New Bankruptcy Law: Recommended Not Only for Those Going out of Business"]

[Text] Undoubtedly, the managements of insolvent enterprises produced one of the most unresolvable problems of the Hungarian economy for almost five years now. According to estimates, enterprises are indebted to each other to the tune of more than 300 billion forints. This is the so-called "standing in line" phenomenon. With next year's termination of the thus-far ineffective state-ordered bankruptcy reorganization processes and with the simultaneous introduction of the new bankruptcy law it has become the government's stated purpose to remove from the economy far more insolvent enterprises than before, moreover, within a short period of time. Most of these enterprises are owned by the state.

The new bankruptcy law will help to make disappear not only businesses that cannot be rescued. The framers of the law were guided by the fundamental intent to permit temporarily insolvent firms, or firms expected to shortly become insolvent, to shore up their operations with the help of the new paragraphs. But if endeavors to stabilize the financial situation prove to be a fiasco, no other solution remains than to terminate the enterprises.

But let us not proceed with such haste. If only stormy clouds begin to gather over an indebted firm but the situation is not hopeless, that firm is better off if it asks for immediate bankruptcy proceedings. Contrary to the prevailing mistaken belief, this process does not prompt the immediate termination of a business organization because all the organization does is to call upon its creditors to make a joint effort to put the firm back on its feet. As long as a debtor is not insolvent he is free to decide whether to report bankruptcy or request liquidation proceedings against himself. Such decisions must be agreed upon, however, by the directors, the owners as well as the affected interest groups. On the other hand, if a firm like this has failed to pay to even a single creditor within 90 days from the date agreed upon previously, the firm is obligated to report itself as bankrupt.

Courts will refrain from initiating bankruptcy proceedings only if the initiators were persons not authorized by law, if the enterprise has failed to reach an agreement with its executive organs, or if three years have not

## HUNGARY

passed since the possible announcement of an earlier bankruptcy. Bankruptcy proceedings begin otherwise; during the 90-day period following the publication of proceedings in CEGKOZLONY the debtor is obligated to pay only wages and benefits to its workers while payment on the rest of his debts is delayed.

This is followed by negotiations between the debtor and the creditors. Courts will initiate liquidation proceedings 15 days after the expiration of the three-month moratorium on payments if no agreement satisfactory to all parties has been reached. Such proceedings may be requested not only by the debtor, but also by creditors or by the person who performs the final settlement. At that point the courts abandon their thus far passive role and examine the debtor's financial situation. The law provides that among other criteria, a firm may be regarded as insolvent if it had failed to repay valid debts within 60 days after their due date or if it disregarded the agreement reached in the course of the bankruptcy proceeding. Contrary to provisions that have prevailed thus far, future bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated even if the debtor is unable to pay but has sufficient assets to settle his debts.

Creditors and business organizations may reach agreements at any time during the liquidation proceeding. But negotiations come to a conclusion only if half the number of creditors representing two-thirds of all debts approve of

the agreement. Approval of agreements signifies the fact that the enterprise has escaped bankruptcy.

One may request the preparation of a liquidation financial statement during an ongoing liquidation proceedings, but two years after commencing the proceedings the obligation to prepare a financial statement and to forward a final inventory to the court rests with the firm being liquidated. Based on these documents courts decide in final sessions to conclude liquidation proceedings, i.e., about terminating the business organizations subject to liquidation. Assets not sold will then be distributed by the court to the creditors according to an established order of priority for claims. Creditors must also be careful because the new law provides that claims must be announced within one year from the commencement of liquidation. The state does not provide guarantees, it will not make payments in lieu of debtors.

Situations may exist in which the debtor's assets do not suffice to pay for the cost of liquidation. In such cases the court will terminate firms with an immediate effect in the framework of simplified liquidation proceedings.

Final settlement is used with respect to firms which ceased to exist without a legal successor and whose assets cover its creditor's claims, i.e., the firm is not insolvent. But if, in the meantime, the assets prove to be insufficient, it takes only a single action on part of the court to change the ongoing final settlement process into a liquidation process.

**Vatra Gathering Attended by FSN, PUNR**

92BA0218B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 26 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Virgil Lazar: "Shock Wave of Official Nationalism"]

[Text] The political duel between the FSN [National Salvation Front] and the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] is heating up. In some counties in Transylvania, such as Cluj, Sibiu Bihor, etc., it is rightly said that the Hungarian extremists in Odorhei, who are not even paid by the opposition, could not have served Romanian nationalist extremism better than with their unfortunate and reprehensible idea about the country of the Szeklers. It was the spark that set off the explosion of official nationalist rhetoric. It was the pretext that brought the Covasna-Hargita report to the rostrum of Parliament, which no one had the courage to really attack. It was the signal at which our members of Parliament, desirous of appearing as...patriotic and intransigent as possible before the future voters, showed the country a televised spectacle of aggravation of the nationalities problem. What followed is well known, and we have all seen and heard it with contradictory feelings of anxiety and helplessness and rage at the Hungarian extremists, and shame for ours.

People in Transylvania with good judgment irrevocably condemn the proposal to autonomize the Szekler country and the abuses in Covasna-Hargita, and they do not agree that we should make our lives a nightmare. A reknowned university historian at Babes-Bolyai said to me, "It was Parliament's duty to take a firm, restrained and dignified stand, concentrating everything in a single session, whereas the sessions were transformed into a veritable festival of flag-waving discourses, some of them downright painful. This led to trivializing an actually very serious situation...."

The shock wave of official nationalism, as members of Parliament like Messrs. Dumitrascu, Ceontea, Vulpescu, Botis, etc., presented it, was received variously in Transylvania. Mr. Radu Ceontea's speech, for example, deeply disappointed even his adherents, because in their opinion the PUNR senator from Mures committed an egregious blunder, so to speak: he vehemently defended the Securitate! The indignant people wonder, "How does Mr. R. Ceontea know how guilty one of the Securitate chiefs in Timisoara is? The city where women and children were fired upon, where corpses were burned, and where unthinkable tortures went on?"

But a recent meeting of the Vatra Romaneasca in Cluj gave us the most accurate indication of how the shock wave of nationalism promoted on the parliamentary level reverberated in Translyvania, a meeting that repeated what happened in Parliament with a "slight" difference: There were no representatives of the Hungarian population in the hall! In the second place, the PUNR's and the FSN's battle to win over members of the Vatra Romaneasca was more apparent there than

anywhere. And so, on the pretext presented on a platter by the Hungarian extremists, the battle was actually fought between Romanians. And so it happened that a quite heated debate was held in front of about 300 spectators. Among the main protagonists were Messrs. Ion Crisan, vice president of the PUNR, Mihai Talpeanu, a recently appointed FSN senator and last year's mayor of Cluj, Ioan Gavra, a PUNR deputy, etc. What did they say? Mr. Crisan said, "The PUNR is not the Vatra's child. The Vatra must be organized like the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania], going as far as the formation of guards...." And so Mr. Crisan, who seems to have a high rank as a reserve officer in a certain branch of the service, is longing for the workers' guards. He wants them on the streets and he wants them all around us to guard us day and night, as in a permanent state of seige. How free we would feel! If I were to be malicious, however, I would say that University Professor Crisan, who misses no opportunity to display his "high patriotism" that motivates him, lacks confidence in the Army. He probably wants the PUNR to have an army of its own composed of members of the Vatra Romaneasca and commanded by a colonel like him and Mr. Ceontea.

Of course. Mr. Mihai Talpeanu also wants to command such a militarized structure, but in an FSN view of it. "The Vatra Romaneasca should form a general staff," he pointed out, "to counteract the good organization the Hungarian have (sic!). This government is weak...." What inspired Mr. Talpeanu? The Romanian Government? After all, all our tragedies from the revolution on have taken place under its rule.... But Mr. Talpeanu proposed as many other absurdities in order to please those in the hall: "Let us go as far as expulsion. Let us overwhelm them through superior numbers (the Hungarians, of course—our note). The Hungarian schools and the works of Buracu and Doinei Cornea enable the Hungarians to come in with a low average and then become the Romanians' bosses. The census will be taken solely by Romanians," and many other things of the same caliber. In addition to his nationalist intransigencies, Mr. Talpeanu is also nostalgic for the Securitate and its informers: "No one will tell me any more who is meeting with whom, what car it is and where it stops," etc. He even found a reason why as mayor of Cluj he would not sell commercial premises at auction: "Because Hungarians would buy them even if a Romanian would bid for them, because it is not known what Hungarian is hiding behind him!" And so the former member of the county bureau of the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] does not permit privatizing out of his express fear of Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. It would be best to auction them himself, as a good Romanian who declares himself everywhere and is particularly well marked by Securitate-communist flaws.

In his turn, Deputy Ioan Gavra put on a real show—a gratuitous one to be sure. Votes had to be won in the hall at any price, so that he resorted to clumsy attacks upon a colleague of his in Parliament, a colleague of Hungarian

nationality of course. For the rest he stepped on the nationalist pedal as hard as he could, telling the audience what an effort they, the PUNR members of Parliament, are making to do away with the practices based on ethnic criteria: "Let us try to get rid of this Ceausescist scourge, the UDMR, so that you too will feel more free." So that you will see why we, the Romanians in Translyvania, do not feel free!

The climax is that the Vatra Romaneasca meeting had unexpected consequences! The Cluj FSN published a declaration full of reproaches of the PUNR. We think some passages are illustrative of the battle, sometimes veiled, sometimes straightforward, coming from the two political units in a race against time to win the Transylvanian electorate: "We express our disappointment and surprise that a political party that calls itself a 'Romanian National Unity Party' has transformed a general and open discussion into an electoral campaign. We regret it especially because such behavior, which does not serve the Romanian cause but the interests of a petty politicianism, creates a false identity between the Unionea Vatra Romaneasca and the PUNR (...), and the PUNR members of Parliament, and even he, (Ion Crisan—our note) have used the occasion provided by the Vatra Romaneasca to open attacks upon our political unit and its national leader. (...) The FSN has never attacked the PUNR and considers their interference in its internal affairs dishonest, such as the attempt to change our national leader, or Mr. Crisan's threat, 'Personally I would hail Petre Roman into court.' We sent him a letter advising him that we are with him and not to give in to the UDMR's insistence on appointing Hungarian prefects in Hargita and Covasna counties. He did not even deign to reply..." It is clear how deceitfully this fashionable opposition party has conducted its policy toward the government. And the declaration concludes... "The assertion of the PUNR members of Parliament (11 in number) that they originated the correct position on the nationalities problem that was approved by the Romanian Parliament seems unwarranted to us...." It is clear that the FSN is taking over the nationalities problem in force and is trying to turn it to its own account for the next elections.

How have the ordinary citizens received the shock wave of official nationalism? By standing in lines for bread, for salami and other sausages, and for oil, when there is any, by swearing like a trooper whether in Romanian or in Hungarian, and by shivering from the cold in unison. According to them, all that has happened in Parliament means only "words!"

**PNT-cd Chief Speaks at International Congress**  
*92BA0218D Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian*  
 26-27 Nov 91 p 3

[“Text” of report presented by Mr. Corneliu Coposu, official of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, PNT-cd, at the Christian Democratic Congress in

Rome; date not given: “The Action for Human Freedom and Dignity According to Our Doctrine”]

[Text] In December 1989 Romania threw off the communist yoke at the cost of many lives of noble youths. Our revolution has been stolen. We are still in the opposition, but we know that freedom is possible. With God's help our devoted efforts will succeed in bringing freedom, dignity, and a truly democratic life to Romania.

It is our duty to look to the future that we must build in this Europe that is reviving after its long division. My considerations will be based to a great extent upon papal documents, from “Rerum Novarum” (RN) to “Centesimus Annus” (CA), and also upon the doctrine of the Second Vatican Council, set forth mainly in “Gaudium et Spes,” the pastoral constitution concerning the church in the contemporary world.

I think it is significant that this forum is held in Rome, the place where this new Europe was born, the Europe of understanding and collaboration among its peoples.

For the flower of human civilization, with its fruits in the spiritual, artistic, and scientific fields was developed in Europe, and the principles of civil freedom and equality, the foundations of modern civilization, radiated from there over the entire world.

European civilization was perfected by the Christian doctrine. On the threshold of the third millennium that doctrine has led to Christian democracy, promoted by our party as well. The great trend of Christian democracy is attracting so many adherents today because it meets the essential aspirations of the human being.

Many political doctrines, from liberalism to Marxism, have tried to find ways to improve the conditions of human life.

Those political doctrines were born of the industrial revolution, which shook society profoundly with its work in large enterprises, poverty of the workers, and child and female labor.

The first solution proposed, that of liberalism, was stimulating for a good many enterprising and dynamic minds, but it contained a selfish, even cynical element that could never have satisfied the broad strata of society. Man naturally aspires to social justice and also to living conditions that promise a little happiness, while liberalism promises happiness only to the winners. This doctrine clearly required correction by society and by the rulers, who were not concerned with this problem at the start, and who acted on the laissez faire, laissez passer principle in the hope that the world would proceed by itself.

Socialism's answer was based on Marxism, which incites the poor to hatred of the rich and maintains that any ownership must be suppressed and that the property of each must be common to all, a theory which, so far from solving the problems, only did harm to the workers by

distorting the state's function and disrupting the whole moral order (RN, 3). The remedy proved worse than the disease (CA, 12).

The fundamental error of socialism is anthropological (CA, 13): It overlooks the individual in his entirety, body and soul. It considers him merely an element subordinated to the operation of the social and economic mechanism and assumes that the good of the individual can be achieved outside of his own responsible decision.

The first cause of this mistaken idea is atheism, which ignores the transcendent dignity of the human person. Atheism also gives rise to the idea of a conflict into which ethical or legal considerations do not enter, a conflict wherein despising the adversary leads to despising one's own dignity, and a conflict wherein the good of society as a whole is not sought but rather the interest of a single party, which is substituted for the common good and is ready to destroy all that opposes it (CA, 14).

The Catholic Church intervened in this conflict with the RN encyclical of 15 May 1891. It had been preceded three years before by "Libertas Praestantissimum" (1888), which was already of a political nature, pointing out that human freedom is in an integral relationship with truth (CA, 4), without which it falls prey to disordered passions and ultimately destroys itself.

The evils that RN tried to combat derived from an exercise of freedom that departed from the truth about the human being. More recently Pope Leo XIII formulated the fundamental truths and laws to be observed in labor relations and in society: The encyclical mentioned natural and legitimate rights (CA, 5). Peace is the tranquillity of order—*"Pax est tranquillitas ordinis,"* Saint Augustine said....

After a severe condemnation of the class struggle, without failing to remind the rich of their great responsibilities indicated by the Gospel, Pope Leo XIII pointed out the true answer to the conflict. In the first place it is observance of the worker's rights, his dignity, and the dignity of his labor (RN, 34) through which he expresses himself and performs his vocation (CA, 5). The principle of private ownership follows from this principle, but without forgetting the universal purpose of the earth's goods (RN, 3-12).

The state cannot confine itself to watching over one part of its citizens alone without doing justice to the other part, which is in the greatest number. While protecting private property rights it must take special care of the weak and the poor (RN, 3-9, 34, 38).

All these declarations of Pope Leo XIII's were of a kind to upset the mentalities that were previously inclined to see a strictly personal matter in a labor contract.

Later on, all these rights were recognized and established in official international declarations and agreements, although Pope John Paul II wondered whether the legal

provisions in force and in the practice of the industrialized countries actually ensure these elementary rights effectively (CA, 9).

The RN encyclical maintains that there must be an autonomy of economic activities with which the state must not interfere. But the state must create legislation under which the economic activities go on in such a way as to ensure a certain equality between the parties so that neither one will get the better of the other (RN, 26-29).

Leo XIII also outlined a theory of the legal state, wherein the law and not the arbitrary will of people is sovereign, in referring to the separation of the three powers (RN, 12-35).

Meanwhile other papal documents were devoted to social problems. "Quadragesimo Anno" mentions a class struggle without hatred or violence (CA III). The role of the trade unions must also be mentioned, which is taken up in Pope John Paul II's encyclical "Laborem Exercens" (LE) of 1981. It is the duty of the trade unions to combat the effects of unemployment and see that instances of exploitation are eliminated (LE, 20).

The state must contribute directly to the implementation of these principles (that is the subsidiarity principle) by aiding economic activity, creating new jobs, and, indirectly, by supporting the principle of solidarity (LE, 8; CA, 15).

The church has no particular model to propose, but it offers a special doctrine that recognizes the favorable principle of the market and the enterprising spirit, emphasizing their necessary orientation toward the common good (CA, 43).

The Christian Democratic parties have a duty to see that rights are observed, to watch over the dignity and freedom of the citizens, and especially to see that the weak and unfortunate are respected and protected.

Romanians steadfastly hope to achieve a legal state in Romania after a half century of abuses and injustices. Therefore, justice must be done now. But we know that goodness is a duty of justice too.

Moreover, in a free society the social nature of man does not stop at the state level but manifests itself in various intermediate groups beginning with the family and then going on to economic, social, political and cultural associations, which enjoy an autonomy of their own (CA, 13).

Yet there is a risk, the one presented by the "consumer society," which wants to overcome Marxism on a purely materialistic ground, exalting man's material satisfactions in a market society that excludes the spiritual values to the same extent that Marxism does (CA, 19). Of course, that is a risk that the liberated countries in the East can incur, but the young generations everywhere can just as readily—if their instruction is limited to technical concepts—neglects the spiritual culture.

Education of youth requires a policy that begins with protection of the family, which is the sanctuary of life from the first moment of conception and which must offer society a coherent social-cultural system responding to the ethical and religious aspects of human experience. And in connection with the good of the family, we must also consider the problems of habitation and town planning (CA, 37, 38).

Ecological concerns, often claimed by specialized parties, must be considered by all governments in a spirit of international solidarity and responsibility (CA, 38).

Pope John Paul II recognized that the warnings of the RN encyclical were not entirely heeded by the society of the last century and that great misfortune followed as a result (CA, 16).

There, too, the fundamental error was the idea of a freedom not subject to truth and the obligation to respect others' interests (CA, 17). That freedom, interpreted in an arbitrary unscrupulous way, led to the terrible cycle of totalitarianisms and wars that shook the whole world between 1914 and 1945, wars started by an exclusive nationalism and militarism, and civil and ideological wars (CA, 17). An enormous burden of hate and vindictiveness led to violation of the most sacred human rights and to plans to exterminate peoples and social groups (CA, 17). Whole countries were deprived of freedom, while destruction of their historical memories and cultural roots was attempted. This was also true of Romania.

But the true peace must be achieved, because it involves elimination of the causes of wars and a real reconciliation among peoples (CA, 18).

The defeat of communism has been acknowledged, but there is still a threat of war through militarization of the Third World, through the terrorism of extremist groups, and through the armaments race that is absorbing the resources of domestic economies and the surpluses that could have been used to help the less favored nations. The risk of a total war breaking out in an irrational way and leading to the suicide of humanity is not entirely excluded (CA, 16). The United Nations are still looking for effective alternatives to war (CA, 21).

We cannot fail to recognize that great efforts have also been made in the field of social protection that have been partially crowned by economic success in Western Europe. We must also rightly acknowledge that the parties that are rallying to Christian democracy have great merit in all these.

In expressing my sincere admiration for the countries in the East for this success, I believe I can also express our hope that international solidarity will contribute as generously as possible to our development.

Romania—and it is also true of other countries—has known a democracy rooted in the 1848 Revolution that developed, and improved itself. In 1866 Romania had a

modern constitution, it became a constitutional monarchy in 1881, and in 1923 a new constitution was proclaimed that was regarded in that period as one of the most modern and judicious ones in Europe. Without the compromise at Yalta, Romania would have had a well-defined place in the concert of nations.

In today's Romania communist staffers and the Securitate still hold power, legitimized according to the government by the 1990 elections, which were falsified from the start by a violent electoral campaign in which even crimes were committed as well as innumerable acts of terrorism and destruction of our offices, culminating in the theft of the votes on election day.

The government's abuses and malpractices and its slanders and lies are internationally notorious. Under these circumstances they talk about the weakness of the opposition. I would sooner say it is its strength, its moral strength that the government fears.

On the eve of the new elections (local) we find ourselves totally lacking in material means. In two years since the revolution in 1989 not one of our old offices and possessions have been returned to us. The costs of gasoline and transportation have reached peaks that will not permit us to conduct even a modest electoral campaign. Our party is allowed only four minutes a week on Romanian TV, which serves as an electoral rostrum for the present government for the rest of the time.

Nevertheless, we are counting on awakening a certain part of the electorate and especially on the enthusiasm of the youths.

For long decades our party's struggle has been the very struggle to safeguard our nation.

Despite the privations imposed by our state, still structured on a communist foundation, we assure you that we shall succeed because we have the true principles upon which Romanian politics can be founded and which are those of Christian democracy.

#### Presidential Press Office Answers Roman Charges

92BA0368A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian  
28 Dec 91 p 3

[Report on Presidential Press Office answer to Petre Roman's open letter in AZI: "Roman-Ilieșcu 'Dialogue' Continues"]

[Text] The press office of the president of Romania released a communique in connection with the "Open letter addressed to Mr. Ion Iliescu" in the newspaper AZI by Mr. Petre Roman. The delay in the release of an answer to the above document was explained by the decision of the president of Romania not to cloud in this manner the events dedicated to the anniversary of the December 1989 revolution and to its martyrs and fighters.

After stating that President Ion Iliescu suggested a "dialogue" to the FSN [National Salvation Front] national leader "in a spirit of political responsibility," which Mr. Petre Roman turned down, the presidential press office communique made several clarifications regarding the criticism and accusations leveled at Mr. Ion Iliescu by the author of the "Open letter." We will cite these clarifications in full:

1. In February of this year, Mr. Petre Roman, the prime minister at the time, asked the president to lend the authority of his position to supporting the replacement of the presidents of the two houses, especially of the president of the Senate. Mr. Ion Iliescu naturally refused, explaining that the president cannot involve himself in such an action, that the election or replacement of the presidents of the two houses was an exclusively parliamentary matter, and that in a law-governed state the executive branch is not permitted to interfere in issues of the legislative branch, the supreme body of power. Mr. Roman, however, distorted the sense of that discussion in his letter, representing it as an example of the president's opposition "to the idea of rejuvenating important state institutions and structures."

2. Mr. Ion Iliescu had no way of intervening "directly" in Mr. Petre Roman's election or nonelection as national leader of this political group for the simple reason that he did not attend the proceedings of the latest FSN national convention, having withdrawn from that political group as required by the law.... The fact that he expressed certain doubts regarding some of the provisions of the Front statute at a meeting with the FSN executive leadership before the convention, had nothing to do with the issue of Mr. Roman running for the FSN leadership.

3. The most serious insinuation—as untrue as it was irresponsible—concerned the statement that in August the president had allegedly taken a stand "against the government communique that unequivocally condemned the Moscow putsch." Such a statement, serenely launched by Mr. Roman, is strange, to say the least. At the time of the Moscow putsch, the former prime minister was vacationing in Madrid. His return home, at the insistent request of the President, occurred after the release of the communique of the Romanian Supreme Defense Council, which was immediately convened in emergency meeting. Romania was one of the first countries to react against the events in Moscow. Within the Council there was no dispute in the assessment of those events. There were no differences of substance, merely of form and timing, between the communique of the Supreme Defense Council, released one day earlier, President Ion Iliescu's statements, and the government declaration.

4. The fact that Mr. Ion Iliescu received a delegation of miners in September, amid the tense situation prevailing, was the only way to defuse the conflict, and cannot be described, as Mr. Petre Roman put it, as a "capitulation" by the head of state. Before receiving the delegation of miners, the president met with leaders of

the political parties represented in Parliament, including the executive chairman of the FSN. Directly consulted, the political leaders thought that meeting with such a delegation was an opportune step.

Would it have been preferable, as Mr. Roman suggested, to use force, thereby causing irreparable human and material losses? What good would it have done to proclaim a "state of emergency," as Mr. Roman repeatedly requested of the president, an idea rejected by the other members of the Supreme Defense Council (...)

5. The attempt made by Mr. Roman and his supporters among the AZI editorial staff is both hard to accept and disloyal: They launched a genuine slander campaign against President Iliescu in an attempt to present Mr. Roman as a "sacrifice" and as the "victim" of an anti-Roman campaign allegedly inspired by the president. The FSN leader even stooped as low as to support the absurd thesis that President Iliescu allegedly organized or inspired the miners' raid of Septmeber in order to remove him. In any democratic regime, the government's resignation at a time of crisis is a normal procedure; for Mr. Roman (despite the fact that the idea of laying down his mandate was his), it became a kind of personal tragedy.

6. The program of reforms and of disbanding the structures of the communist totalitarian state was initiated already in the evening of 22 December 1989, when the FSN Council abolished those structures and tentatively drafted the strategic lines of the transformation of Romanian society, not just by the government program presented to Parliament by the former prime minister on 28 June 1990. The package of laws that outlined the guidelines of the process of reform and of transformation of the inherited bankrupt economy into a market economy was the accomplishment of all the political forces represented in Parliament, primarily the FSN, the majority party (...).

Finally, the press office declared that it was authorized to clearly reassert the fact that President Ion Iliescu was open to dialogue with all the political forces, as well as his refusal to engage in sterile personal polemics, profoundly damaging to the domestic political climate.

#### **Iliescu's Negative Comments on Monarchy Criticized**

*92BA0218A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 26 Nov 91 p 1*

[Article by Andrei Ionescu: "The Republic, From a Scepter to a Cudgel"]

[Text] It has become common to hear the president of the country uttering, in his well-known propagandistic style, an uninterrupted series of communist convictions that are disguised in a coat with a new cut, but nonetheless a borrowed coat, and one that is accordingly not very big. We have seen and heard him in the form of a vigorous defender of a republic with a pronounced (to be

sure) presidential presence. The convictions expressed now, at a time when he is barely adjusting—whether he likes it or (especially) not—to the new society of law and to the reasoning on which it depends, were based in their time on the same flimsy grounds of flagrant falsehoods and frauds intended to discredit the institution of the monarchy.

Essentially, in his opinion, presented in an objective tone as if it were an unquestionable scientific finding, society would lose control of a monarchy (it would come "from outside" and would be "imposed" on society), whereas a presidency would be under society's control and would accordingly be a more modern form of government than a monarchy, which he calls "anachronistic." If others permit themselves the luxury of maintaining such an historical "relic" it is their affair.

So be it? In order to see how matters stand in our reality (for that is where the president's plea applies), I think it is sufficient to remember what kind of societal control was possible under the presidency with the scepter of the "odious" predecessor, the one who revealed the true face of the falsely traditional republican governance in Romania by usurping this royal symbol (now repudiated by his successor), so that we would no longer say (for a while, but in vain—so much for control!) that it was established in 1947 by an illegal act!

Or rather, without having to go back to the time when all the saviors of today's society were denied in an almost complete consensus (What would we do if that consensus were complete? It could be asserted—God save us!—that democratic pluralism is not allowed), let us consider more recent but no less telling examples. And let us remember what kind of control an incipient Romanian civil society (allegedly desired by all) could exercise from December 1989 until today under the conditions of the initial counterrevolution (let us call it what it was) that crushed the desperate street revolt and then under the equally hard conditions of the "stabilizing" countermeasures that followed, culminating in the distinctly "original" method of exercising the presidential function with a cudgel by calling out the miners as a force for "order" in the tragic June of 1990.

Unfortunately, the transition from the president with a scepter to the president with a cudgel was a deterioration, because the circumstances were (we must acknowledge it) new to and unexpected by the government after December 1989. How else could it have maintained itself where there were forces for continuity other than by resorting to the tradition (from the years of the people's republic) of repressive control and the "definite answer" (was it not?) given to the "destabilizing attempt?" But under these new, unexpected and inconvenient circumstances, the tried and true methods of "control" betrayed their barbarity because they had to be used in broad daylight in all their hideous nakedness of the Nazi-communist kind.

Do such cruel actions leave room for any guarantee of control by society (which we want to be civil) over the president's discretionary power? Does the president illustrate the "modernity" of his idea of the form of government suitable for Romania with such actions?

If the transition from a scepter to a cudgel did not change anything in the area of power, yet something was changed in that of society in the interval between the first and the second president. Now at least we are no longer so easily intimidated by the former activists with aspirations (unconcealed) to be enlightened despots, and now our perceptions are keener and more certain and we dare to say when we lacked the courage to say after the terror we had experienced, namely, that the calm appearance of purely theoretical considerations and disinterested forms conceals a cruel and clever restriction of power. The plea of the president of the republic for the presidential republic could not be a clearer plea *pro domo sua* [from one's own interest], especially since with the well-known reflex of communist and neocommunist guile the president assures us with a smile that he is not supporting his own cause—a cause, moreover, that has been totally and permanently compromised in the eyes of all those who saw long ago or have learned to see now what the allegedly democratic and popular Romanian Republic, imposed on the country by force, has meant in reality and not on paper for about 45 years of communist nightmare.

With a vaguely renovated design for the paralyzing democratic centralism of sad memory and with the excessive prerogatives that he holds at present, the president cannot convince anyone that he could ensure the control of society (civil) over the presidency, but only—with the consequences we know—the president's control over society (noncivil), whereby society has merged more and more deeply with the mire of noncivilization.

We will discuss the "nonanachronism" of the monarchy and the relations of the institution of monarchy with civil society on another occasion.

#### Stolojan Urged To Resolve Cultural Needs

*92BA0218C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 26 Nov 91 p 2*

[“Text” of open letter from Mircea Dinescu, president of the Writers' Union, to Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan: “A Word to Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan”]

[Text] After repeated memoranda, indications, appeals, protests, etc., addressed by the Writers' Union to the president of Romania, the government, and the Senate for more than an entire year, all without result, we are addressing ourselves to you, Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, and decidedly and most seriously call your attention to the grave danger that has threatened the survival of our culture, art, literature, and science and is threatening it more and more today because of measures that have overlooked the major and urgent requirements

for constant and regular subsidizing and support of some fields vital to a nation's existence. What can the 0.33 percent allocated to culture amount to when not even that is exempt from the policy of neglect and abandonment? Has there been or is there any coherent program of economic-legal-financial measures to protect our national culture? In all civilized countries the programs to protect and subsidize culture are matters of decency and honor and of elevation of political thought.

Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, do not consider your mandate to govern a mere transitional one, or one with very limited responsibility. Meditate upon the fact that you can take an important step in cultural policy that has not been given timely or the most responsible consideration.

Before the first quarters of 1991 alone and without minimal measures to protect our national culture, the price of paper went up beyond tolerable limits and the increases are threatening to get out of hand. The costs of publishing and printing did too, in addition to an intolerable situation in distribution. Cultural, literary, artistic, and scientific books, as well as journals and publications of that nature, are liable to become almost impossible to print and publish. And if they are published anyway, they become luxuries at prices impossible for the general public.

On the other hand the way is open to a ruthless trade in anticultural and antisocial books and filthy publications in printings that are as obscure as they are excessive and which monopolize the market and do not offend good taste alone. Pirating publishing houses, pirated editions, publishers' thefts of translations from world literature, and thefts of cultural, artistic, and scientific intelligence are a few of the serious results getting by public control that are apparent in the light of day and not just at the subway entrances. It is not only the economic malaise and its perils that must be shaken but also the social, moral and educational malaise resulting from abandonment of the cultural levers of the national interest. The outputs of unregistered or unauthorized publications launching the scandalous careers of the aggressive, greedy, and harmful enriched persons, and the illegal financial operations circumventing the provisions for payment—through the creative unions—of benefits and fees and for the respective stamps, have been defrauding not only our trade unions, but also the state of enormous sums, although in the last 18 months hierarchic and superhierarchic control organs were founded under the government which are proving ineffective against the unprecedented thefts and corruption.

You are a man of financial figures and accuracy. At least shudder because such thefts and such widespread and ruthless antisocial and anticultural dealings are evading taxes due to the state, impairing budgetary health, and bringing on a catastrophic tax evasion.

And once again: Without serious attention to its national culture, art, literature, and science, what image of

Romania can be created in the world, Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, even if it is only a matter of a transitional period?

**Suto Article Contents Termed Lies, Exaggerations**  
*92BA0368B Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian*  
*20-22 Dec 91 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Dan Constantin: "What's Bothering the 'Bothersome Hungarian'?" ]

[Text] Writer Andras Suto has not been heard in the country's public life for a while. After the Tigră Mureş incidents in March 1990, in which the writer was attacked and suffered damage to one eye, he traveled to Hungary and the United States for treatment. We recall that while hospitalized in the country, immediately after the violence to which he fell victim, Andras Suto was visited by the Ion Iliescu, president of the CPUN [Provisional National Unity Council]. And now, after more than 20 months of silence, Mr. Andras Suto is back in the news with a vehement anti-Romanian position published in the Monday, 16 December 1991 issue of the Swiss newspaper GAZETTE DE LAUSANNE. Recently, Father Laszlo Tokes predicted the outbreak of civil war in Romania, and now here is Mr. Andras Suto, described in the title of the article as the "Bothersome Hungarian," talking of a "future civil war in the area." But let us see what are the arguments claimed by the Romanian writer of Hungarian nationality, Andras Suto, (whose work, if we remember correctly, until a few years back was included in the intermediary school program for literature) in order to demonstrate the imminent nature of an interethnic conflict of civil war magnitude.

We must first point out that Mr. Andras Suto, proceeding probably from the experience of Father Tokes, did not present his idea in the form of a classical "Question-Answer" interview. The author of the article, whose name indicates that he is a relative of our compatriot (Laurent Nagy), related his talk with Andras Suto—a journalistic means of protecting both sides for inexact statements.

This preventive measure was opportune, because this "story-interview" turned out to be a string of lies and exaggerations.

In order to identify the site of the "discussion with the most famous Transylvanian Hungarian writer," the town of Tigră Mureş is placed in "the heart of Dracula country." Here, in the spring of 1990, during those "dark days, Romanian extremists sought to drink Hungarian blood," claimed the article carried by the Lausanne newspaper (In fact, distorting the truth about the Tigră Mureş events has become one of the favorite themes of the Hungarian irredentists. Not for anything in the world will they admit the existence of the Cofariu case or of the Romanian churches burned down and their faithful chased out of their own homes by the fear of knives.)

However, Mr. Andras Suto, wounded in those days, "will continue to demand rights for the 2 million Hungarians in Romania to the end of his days." "His last words," the article continued, "will be for his comrades in suffering to find the strength and courage until the international community will have opened its eyes to the hardships of the Hungarians, who have become the 'Jews of Transylvania.'" (I have to admit that this was the first time that I saw this classification of the Hungarian minority.)

The best example to illustrate the atmosphere of terror in which the Hungarians live in Tîrgu Mureş, is the writer's family itself: "Only his wife (Andras Suto's) dares to step out (of the house). However, every day she asks the taxi driver to take a different route (!?) and she takes good care not to speak Hungarian." (Mr. Nagy's example may not have been well chosen. He should have cited the mildest of the pages of the Harghita-Covasna report and drawn inspiration from the atrocities committed by his conationals.)

In the opinion of Andras Suto, the killers (Romanians, evidently) "are on the point of organizing pogroms against the members of the largest community [as published] of Europe." "Many Hungarian, but also Romanian intellectuals," the author stated, "are talking of a forthcoming civil war." Who is maneuvering the situation toward such a denouement? "Television, with its damaging reports (Suto's opinion) and the newspapers with their lying articles (Suto again) are daily contributing to the deterioration of the situation." Already "Romanians are talking of terrible acts of revenge."

Andras Suto then stepped into the minefield of history and, in the absence of scientific arguments, claimed that "mythology has contaminated the spirit of most of the Romanian public." The myths that have contaminated the society were reportedly that we, the Romanians, have lived here for thousands of years and that we are xenophobic. "Ousting the foreigners was always Bucharest's goal." Even today, the power continues to sent Romanian colonists to Transylvania (!!), thus continuing the policy of Ceausescu and his predecessors to the letter. (Ed. note: Let us once again refer to the Harghita-Covasna Report and see what the demographic shifts are.)

The inept statements of Mr. Andras Suto, or of the author of the article (the attribution is difficult because of the form) continue on the crescendo: "The genius of the Carpathians promised self-determination to the Hungarians. President Iliescu not only did not improve their situation, but was even more perverse (!)—if that is still possible (the author delicately stressed)—than his predecessor." (The slogan "Down with Iliescu" was thus propelled all the way to Lausanne.) But what upsets Mr. Andras Suto most is when some foreigner, who on top of everything else is a member of the UN Human Rights Commission and of the group monitoring the observance of those rights in Romania, does not see the oppression to which the Hungarians are subjected to in Transylvania. Consequently, Mr. Joseph Voyame, a

Swiss, had the cheek to declare on television that "Romania is showing considerable progress in the observance of human rights." The man, complained to each other the two authors of the article teeming with lies, "refused to see what strikes the eye."

What strikes the eye in this article, from which we culled a few passages representative of its tone, are the dishonesty and the lies. Whose interests are served by this kind of publicistic frame-up? Instead of a reply, we will translate the end of the article:

"Like a climbing rose, Andras Suto climbed up the prison walls. Like one of the heroes of his books, he made a rope out of the Hungarian flag in order to escape."

#### Ministry of National Defense Promotions

*92P20113A Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL  
in Romanian 13 Dec 91 p 1*

[Text] of Decree of the President of Romania Promoting Some Colonels in the Ministry of National Defense to the Rank of Major General]

[Text] On the basis of Article 82, paragraph 1, subparagraph k) of Decree-Law No. 92/1990 on the election of the Parliament and the president of Romania, the president of Romania decrees:

#### Article 1

The following colonels are promoted to the rank of major general: Colonels Ioan Cornel Badoiu, Nicolae Mihai-Nicolae Bina, Grigorie Eugeniu Caplescu, Gheorghe Vasile Cretu, Stefan Mugurel-Cristian Florescu, Gheorghe Gheorghe Florica, Nicolae Gheorghe Grama, Spiridon Decebal Ilina, Toader Vasile Lates, Traian Augustin Mihai, Ioan Florinel Papuc, Nicolae Nicolae Pastinica, Cherecheanu-Ulpiu Mihail-Ulpiu Popa, Eugeniu Mihail Popescu, and Simion Emil Valcu.

#### Article 2

Captain First Class Gheorghe Beches is promoted to the rank of rear admiral.

President of Romania  
Ion Iliescu

On the basis of Article 82, paragraph 2 of Decree-Law No. 92/1990 on the election of the Parliament and the president of Romania, we are countersigning this decree.

Prime Minister  
Theodor Stolojan

Bucharest, 29 November 1991  
No. 100

**Rupel's Democrats Lead in DELO Poll**  
*92BA0366A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Dec 91 p 1*

[Article by J.T.: "The Public on the Parties"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 27 Dec—It has been almost two months since we first asked, in a field poll, which party people would vote for if the elections were on Sunday. We repeated the question in this poll, and obtained the following results. Among 1,075 people polled, 279 would vote for Rupel's Democrats, who were in second place in the previous poll; at that time Peterle's Christian Democrats were 0.2 percent ahead of them.

There were 203 respondents who would choose Ribicic's Reformers (the previous time, they were in third place), 121 respondents would decide in favor of Skolc's Liberal Democrats (they improved their position by 1 percent), and this time 106 individuals would decide in favor of Peterle's Christian Democrats. One hundred of those polled would vote for Plut's Greens, Pucnik's Social Democrats would get 72 votes, and both would thus keep the fifth and sixth place that they occupied in the previous poll. Also, Oman's Peasants, for which 20 individuals would vote, Zakelj's Socialists (19 votes), and Pirnat's National Democrats (13 votes) would keep their positions among the voters; the parties at the bottom of the scale, Golj's Christian Liberals and Mocnik's Social Democratic Unionists, would change their order this time.

Among the 68 respondents who did not choose any of the parties, we asked an additional question, about which of the above-mentioned parties they certainly would not vote for. Most of them, 28 respondents, chose Peterle's Christian Democrats, followed by Pucnik's Social Democrats, Oman's Peasants, Ribicic's Reformers, etc. This poll was also conducted by DELO's STIK agency, in 57 Slovene districts:

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**If elections were held on Sunday, which party would you vote for? (percent)**

Rupel's Democrats	26.0
Ribicic's Reformers	18.9
Skolc's Liberal Democrats	11.3
Peterle's Christian Democrats	9.9
Plut's Greens	9.3
Pucnik's Social Democrats	6.7
Oman's Peasants' Party	1.9
Zakelj's Socialists	1.8
Pirnat's National Democrats	1.2
Golj's Christian Liberals	0.9
Mocnik's Social Unionists	0.4
None of them	0.6
I would not go to the election	4.6
I do not know which	6.3

**Slovene Daily Planned in Trieste, Ljubljana**  
*92BA0369C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 4 Jan 92 p 3*

[Article by Vinko Vasle: "Will PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK Become the Sixth All-Slovene Political Daily?"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] It would be named REPUBLIKA; does the signing of the contract mean Italian newspaper magnate Melzi's penetration of Slovenia as well?; SKGZ [Slovene Cultural and Economic Union]: the purpose of the contract is only to strengthen the daily newspaper; the project would be headed in Ljubljana by Bozo Kovac.

Ljubljana, 3 Jan—After several (party) newspaper projects that were supposed to pluralize the Slovene media scene were not very successful, we have been promised a new daily newspaper (according to the information we have) for a good two months now. Slovenes are also supposed to have a substantial share in the charms of the daily newspaper being born (it is supposed to be named REPUBLIKA or SVET), which has so far been developing discreetly and in the "underground."

The new paper is supposed to take the place of the former PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK, which has been published in Trieste since 1945, and is supposed to be aimed at informing the Slovene minority in Italy. This year in particular, PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK has been vegetating more than it has been published, since it has encountered a number of difficulties, which are supposed to have been primarily financial, although people familiar with it seriously doubt this. Specifically, PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK has been decaying in content and circulation in recent years. The fact is that it has determined and narrowed the range of its readers itself, because of its completely recognizable political profile in the past and in the present (namely, it is a headquarters for that portion of the Slovene minority that is of communist provenance), and that even at critical times, it has not tried to become less one-sided in party terms. Since it is the only Slovene paper that is published in Italy, that editorial orientation, of course, was rather short-sighted, since it did not even take into account the fact that there had been significant political changes in its homeland, Slovenia. Because of all this, PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK has never apparently known how or wanted to grow into a newspaper for the entire minority.

If, on one hand, the claims that PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK is unprofitable because of its low circulation are understandable, one should not forget, however, that the publisher—the Trieste Press Publishing House—did not listen to the desires and needs of the members of the Slovene ethnic community, but only to specific political components. Since the attempts to solve PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK's crisis this year as well remained party-oriented, the difficulties only increased, and an attempt to reach a minority-wide agreement on PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK failed.

Matters were politically exacerbated back in 1990, when a socialist editor was dismissed from the editorial office and a communist one came to replace him. As early as March 1991, this newspaper's chief editor, Dusan Udovic, mentioned the possibility that PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK would penetrate the Slovene market. It was to become a sort of interregional daily newspaper, in which certain Italian circles, especially important Friuli businessmen, were interested. Now that the paper has obviously come to an end, the latter have also offered considerable support to the emerging new daily.

#### Danger of New Ill-Considered Moves

Will PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK, with a new name, really become the sixth all-Slovene political daily, or will new ill-considered moves and ventures also destroy what is left of the once reputable coastal newspaper? No one is talking about this project officially yet, but it is true that after 12 December, when the SKGZ organized a conference on Gorica on the role of the media in the pluralization of Slovene society, the public learned that the Trieste Press Publishing House had concluded a preliminary contract with a group of Friuli industrialists, headed by Carlo Melzi, on establishing a joint company to publish the newspaper. It was to find a market throughout the entire Slovene area, and thus in the homeland as well. The project, as we have learned, provides for two editorial offices, a 24-member one in Ljubljana (on the premises of Slovenijasport on Titova), and a 17-member one in Trieste. The basic project was supposed to be prepared by former Slovene Information Minister Stane Stanic, who was also to head the Slovene central editorial office.

"I am no longer participating in this project, since the Trieste Press Publishing House has included individuals in it with whom I do not wish to collaborate. That is why I have withdrawn, and also because I wanted to be exclusively responsible for this project, in which I have invested a great deal of work," Stanic explained to us. Now the project is to be headed in Ljubljana by Bozo Kovac, who confirmed for us that the Trieste Press Publishing House had offered to make him the head of the editorial office in Ljubljana. Milan Meden (DNEVNIK) and Slavko Fras, an editor of NASI RAZGLEDI for many years, are also supposed to collaborate with him. The Trieste employers are said to be already offering the future colleagues respectable salaries, which amount to about 2 million lire a month (approximately 2,500 marks).

These plans by the Trieste Press Publishing House also received a response a little before Christmas from the Slovene community, which issued a special announcement in which it complained that "the Trieste Press Publishing House considered the daily newspaper its own property in the negotiations with the Friuli industrialist," and expressed "the fear that the new daily newspaper will become estranged from Slovene people." The challenged SKGZ reiterated through its president, Klavdije Palcic, that "the sole and principal purpose of

the contract is to strengthen the daily newspaper." At the same time, the SKGZ accused the Slovene community of keeping silent about the fact that it had been invited to take part in the project, and that it had demanded a leading role for itself within the daily and the publishing house. The Slovene community answered this caustically and directly:

"We are concerned about the extent of the Italian partners' role and influence in the newspaper, since it is not a matter of indifference to us that the same circles will have influence upon both PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK and PICCOLO (Melzi, in fact, is its new co-owner). We just learned on Sunday that the daily newspaper TRIESTE OGGI used the rotating presses of PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK, which is jointly owned by Italian stockholders, to print shameful insults, in a prominent position, against those convicted in the second Trieste trial, the Slovene prime minister, etc."

A more important question that is being raised is whether the "planner" of the new newspaper has merely commercial and consequently more prosaic goals, or whether it is just a question of the political background of the new newspaper, which has all-Slovene ambitions. The project is also supposed to have been sponsored in the background by Milan Kucan and Gianni De Michelis (the former is also supposed to have selected the head of the Ljubljana editorial board); in all likelihood, it is to be a sort of "opposition" counterweight to the former media "geography" in Slovenia. It is also supposed to have emerged out of the fear of—as we have heard—a breakthrough by the right wing and its "bad habits" from the motherland to the Slovene minority area. This was also linked by certain Trieste circles some time ago with a statement by Lojze Peterle, who expressed willingness to assist PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK, which would have had to undergo certain changes in content. Some minority circles characterized this as "interference in the minority's political autonomy," but it seems that today they are renouncing this same autonomy by establishing one-sided ties with certain political circles in Slovenia; this is certainly not to the minority's benefit, and it does not even need such "protection."

#### The People at PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK Have To Clear Things Up

To be sure, the Ministry of Information does not know much about the project, and we were only told that there were certainly no formal legal obstacles to the newspaper's expanding to the Slovene area. Janez Dular, the member of the government responsible for Slovenes throughout the world and minorities, told us that two delegations had already visited Slovenia during PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK's spring crisis. In the fall, a journalists' union delegation also came; they all wanted Slovene assistance in solving the newspaper's problems.

"The government's position at that time and today is that it would naturally like to help the newspaper, but that first of all, the people at PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK

should clear up certain issues themselves, so that the newspaper would be accepted by all Slovenes in Italy and so that the government would not hear criticisms that it was only helping one side."

Also interesting is the financial scheme of the renovated PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK. The publishers are not only counting on capital from the Friuli industrialists, but also on money provided for the minority

newspaper by the law on border areas. One should also figure in Slovene assistance for the minority, which could also be used for these purposes. Janez Dular told us that it was quite possible, even though the government had not received an official request for such a use of the money. There is also a possibility that this money could be manipulated by just one political party, and Dular emphasized that he also had such feelings.

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